Louisiana State University Law Center

LSU Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2014

The Anomalous Interaction Between Code and Statute--Lessor's
Warranty and Statutory Waiver
Melissa T. Lonegrass
Louisiana State University Law Center, missy.lonegrass@law.lsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Lonegrass, Melissa T., "The Anomalous Interaction Between Code and Statute--Lessor's Warranty and
Statutory Waiver" (2014). Journal Articles. 94.
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship/94

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at LSU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of LSU Law Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

TULANE
LAW REVIEW
VOL. 88

FEBRUARY 2014

NO. 3

The Anomalous Interaction Between Code
and Statute—Lessor’s Warranty and
Statutory Waiver
Melissa T. Lonegrass*
This Article takes up the debate regarding the Louisiana Civil Code’s role and status as
the foremost source of private law in this state, focusing on an aspect of the “ongoing revision”
of the Code of 1870 that has thus far been largely ignored by the scholarly dialogue—the
complex relationship between the Louisiana Civil Code and the Louisiana Revised Statutes.
Although special legislation plays an essential role in all codified legal systems, its relationship
to the Civil Code must be clearly understood, lest statutory law be allowed to undermine core
principles of the legal system. Although the code is no longer the sole, or even primary, source
of law in many civil law jurisdictions, special legislation must be made and applied cautiously,
so to minimize deviations from the default rules of the code. In Louisiana, statutory law,
particularly that found in the Civil Code Ancillaries, too often subverts the Civil Code rather
than supporting it. This Article seeks to elucidate the causes and consequences of this
anomalous interaction between code and statute, using as a case study the law governing waivers
of the lessor’s responsibility for the condition of the leased premises.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Louisiana’s legal history is beleaguered by a number of “great
debates,” all of which center around Louisiana’s sources of law and the
methodology utilized in their application.1 One of the earliest such
debates was sparked in the 1930s by academic critique of Louisiana’s

1.
See John A. Lovett, Another Great Debate?: The Ambiguous Relationship
Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-Revision Jurisprudence as Seen Through the
Prytania Park Controversy, 48 LOY. L. REV. 615, 618-20 (2002).
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fidelity to its civilian roots.2 The accusation that Louisiana law, both in
substance and in application, had lost its civilian character led to a
renaissance of the civil law tradition in this state and to a more
nuanced understanding of Louisiana’s condition as a mixed
jurisdiction.3 The second great debate of Louisiana’s legal history
centered on the precise origins of the Louisiana Digest of 1808,
sparking detailed investigation into whether this state’s private law can
be more closely traced to the laws of France or those of Spain.4 The
most recent great debate, like the great debate of the 1930s, questions
whether Louisiana’s legal system functions like that of a civil law
jurisdiction, or whether we have in some ways abdicated our civilian
heritage.5 The discourse surrounds the process of the “rolling revision”
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and the status of the Revised Civil
Code as the fountainhead of Louisiana’s private law.6 However, unlike
the accusations of Professor Ireland in 1937 that Louisiana had
become “a common law state,”7 the criticism of the rolling revision has

2.
See Gordon Ireland, Louisiana’s Legal System Reappraised, 11 TUL. L. REV. 585
(1937) (arguing that Louisiana lawyers should accept that Louisiana is slowly becoming a
common law state in practice); Harriet Spiller Daggett, Joseph Dainow, Paul M. Hébert &
Henry George McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana,
12 TUL. L. REV. 12 (1937) (arguing that Ireland’s view of the civil law is too static and that the
civil law is capable of retaining its roots while incorporating common law concepts).
See Lovett, supra note 1, at 618.
3.
4.
See Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, Facts and Speculation: A
Rejoinder, 46 TUL. L. REV 628 (1972); Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808:
Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971); Robert A. Pascal,
Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972);
Joseph Modeste Sweeney, Tournament of Scholars over the Sources of the Civil Code of
1808, 46 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1972). Although not entirely resolved, academic fervor over this
dispute has faded from view. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Louisiana Law:
Critical Appraisal of a Controversy, in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 87, 100-03 (Edward F.
Haas ed., 1983) (“There remains the question whether the provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808 were essentially French or essentially Spanish in origin. The answer to this
question will await a study of the substance of the provisions of the 1808 Code in comparison
with French and Spanish laws.”).
See Lovett, supra note 1, at 618-20.
5.
See generally Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Civil Code of Louisiana Is Alive and Well,
6.
64 TUL. L. REV. 147 (1989); James Dennis, Julio Cueto-Rua, David Gruning, Shael Herman,
Vernon Palmer, Cynthia Samuel & A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Great Debate over the Louisiana
Civil Code’s Revision, 5 TUL. CIV. L.F. 49 (1990); Vernon V. Palmer, Revision of the Code or
Regression to a Digest? A Rejoinder to Professor Cueto-Rua, 64 TUL. L. REV. 177 (1989)
[hereinafter Palmer, Revision of the Code]; Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of a Code—The
Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL. L. REV. 221 (1988) [hereinafter Palmer, Death of a Code].
7.
Ireland, supra note 2, at 596 (emphasis omitted) (“Louisiana is today a common
law state.”).
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yet to be laid to rest.8 Instead, the discussion simply evolves as
scholars continue to identify additional evidence of the Code’s
undoing.9
This Article takes up the debate regarding the Louisiana Civil
Code’s role and status as the foremost source of private law in this
state, focusing on an aspect of the rolling revision that has thus far
been largely ignored by the scholarly dialogue—the complex
relationship between the Louisiana Civil Code and the Louisiana
Revised Statutes. The proliferation of legislation enacted outside of
the Civil Code (referred to in this Article as “statutory law”) was one
of the primary reasons why the Louisiana legislature directed the
Louisiana State Law Institute (Law Institute) in 1948 to undertake a
large-scale revision of the Code of 1870. Large volumes of statutory
law do damage to a civil code by detracting from the primacy of the
general principles of law contained within it. When external bodies of
statutory law entirely supplant code principles, the code is made to be
a ghost whose presence is only detected at the borders of the law. Even
isolated provisions of statutory law wreak havoc when they conflict
with code principles that articulate matters of public policy. A largescale revision, it was hoped, would permit lawmakers to reconcile code
and statutory law and to reestablish the primacy of the Civil Code in
Louisiana.
However, despite the prodigious revision efforts of the Law
Institute over the course of the last forty years, statutory law continues
to undermine fundamental principles and policies of the Civil Code in
nearly all key areas of private law. In some cases, the conflict between
code and statute results, understandably, from the piecemeal revision
process—revision in one area of law often produces unforeseen
consequences in other areas not simultaneously amended. In other,
more disappointing cases, the conflict between code and statute results
from legislative oversight owing to hasty drafting or insufficient study.
In all cases, the consequences are dire and range from the creation of
legal uncertainty to the implied repeal of essential elements of the
Civil Code.
The pages that follow explore the effects of statutory law in
Louisiana, focusing particularly on Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised
8.
See Lovett, supra note 1, at 639-52 (describing in detail Professor Palmer’s
critique of the revision process and the academic responses of Professors Yiannopoulos,
Cueto-Rua, and Herman and Judge James Dennis).
See, e.g., id. at 714 (concluding that recent “controversy” surrounding Louisiana
9.
Civil Code article 466 supports Professor Palmer’s thesis).
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Statutes, whose provisions are known as the Civil Code Ancillaries.
Part II of this Article addresses the relationship between civil codes
and statutory law in the civil law tradition. Louisiana is not alone in its
struggle to reconcile code law with statutory law,10 and the experience
of this state should not be assessed without reference to the extensive
scholarly discourse surrounding this vexing problem of legal
methodology. Following this foundation, Part III reviews the history of
statutory law in Louisiana and the Law Institute’s attempts at the
“recodification” of Louisiana law. Part III further addresses the
increasing conflict between statutory enactments and code law
resulting from the rolling revision and investigates both the causes and
effects of this phenomenon. Because dysfunctional interaction
between code law and statutory law is best studied within the context
of specific examples, in Part IV, Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:3221 (R.S. 9:3221), a statute that addresses the effect of a lessee’s
assumption of liability for defects in the leased premises, is used as a
case study to demonstrate the substantive and methodological
difficulties that result when statutory law and code law conflict. Part V
briefly concludes.
II.

STATUTORY LAW AND CODE LAW IN THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION

Louisiana’s civilian experience is in many ways unique, but at the
same time is inseparably tied to the broader narrative of codified law
that defines the civil law tradition. This discourse is a long one, dating
at least to the promulgation of the French Code civil in the early
nineteenth century. But the conversation surrounding codification has
not become stale. Rather, it remains lively, as the viability, and even
the desirability, of codification remain subjects of continual debate.11
An important thread of this discussion concerns the relationship
between codified law and law that exists beyond the borders of the
code. An examination of the necessity of special legislation, and its
impact on a codified system, sheds crucial light on the problems faced
here at home.
10. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 226-27
(3d ed. 2007) (describing how France and the European Union have created hierarchies
within the law to reconcile different forms of legislation with the civil code and with judicial
decisions).
11. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL
CODE 2012, at XLVII, LIX (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., 2012) (“The question of the desirability
of codification is by no means settled in comparative legal theory.”).
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A. The Realms and Roles of Civil Codes and Special Statutes
It is axiomatic that the highest source of law in civil law
jurisdictions, second only to constitutions, is legislation.12 And yet all
legislation does not enjoy the same stature. Civilians distinguish
legislation that is encompassed within the civil code from law that,
while emanating from the legislative will, exists outside of that central
text.13
Codification involves a particular methodology, a full exploration
of which lies far outside the aim or capacity of this Article.14 The
technique of codification is at the same time both an art15 and a
science16 and is thereby distinguished from the promulgation of other
statutory law. It involves “a systematic presentation, synthetically and
methodically organizing a body of general and permanent rules” for a
given jurisdiction.17 Perhaps most importantly, the philosophy of
codification, predicated on ius rationalism, teaches that civil codes are
to treat the whole of private law, without gaps or contradictions.18 They
must therefore be systematic, comprehensive, and complete.19
12.
LXVI.
13.

See GLENDON

ET AL.,

supra note 10, at 227; Yiannopoulos, supra note 11, at

See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 10, at 227; Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus:
The Place of the Civil Code in Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 3233 (2012).
14. For an excellent sampling of the vast literature surrounding the subject of
codification in the civilian tradition, see KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 85-98 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998); Jean Louis Bergel, Principal
Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073 (1988); Alain Levasseur, Code
Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762 (1969) [hereinafter Levasseur, Napoleon];
Alain Levasseur, On the Structure of a Civil Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 693, 697 (1970)
[hereinafter Levasseur, Structure]; Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, A Primer on Codification, 29
TUL. L. REV. 303 (1955).
15. Levasseur, Structure, supra note 14, at 697 (“Codification is an art that obeys
some stringent rules.”).
16. Michael McAuley, Proposal for a Theory and a Method of Recodification, 49
LOY. L. REV. 261, 264 (2003) (“Codification is a science of lawmaking. Yet there is also a
science of codification.”).
17. Bergel, supra note 14, at 1074.
18. See Jean-Louis Baudouin, Reflections on the Process of Recodification of the
Quebec Civil Code, 6/7 TUL. CIV. L.F. 283, 283 (1991-92); Maria Luisa Murillo, The

Evolution of Codification in the Civil Law Legal Systems: Towards Decodification and
Recodification, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 163, 167 (2001); see also Catherine Valcke, The
Unhappy Marriage of Corrective and Distributive Justice in the New Civil Code of Quebec,
46 U. TORONTO L.J. 539, 543 (1996) (arguing that the three main characteristics of civil codes
are “their comprehensiveness, internal coherence, and gaplessness”).
19. See Bergel, supra note 14, at 1077-88 (discussing the features of true
(substantive) codification). This is not to say that systematization and comprehensiveness are
the only aims of codification. A number of other aims are associated with codification,
including:
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Although the methodology of codification is a defining
characteristic of the civil law tradition, the vast majority of legislation
in civilian systems is made in the form of “special legislation”—laws
that are created outside of the codes to regulate topics that the codes
also address, though only generally.20 Some special legislation is
compiled by topic to create entire regimes of law existing outside of
the code. These separate legal regimes—termed “microsystems,”21
“mini-codes,”22 “pseudo-codes,”23 and even “satellite codes”24—are at
both substantive and methodological odds with civil codes.25 A prime
example involves the development of labor law.26 Whereas the civil
codes of France and Germany did little to restrict the freedom of
parties to an employment contract, later-evolving social policies geared
toward the protection of the labor force prompted rules quite alien to
the codes.27 As a result, in both jurisdictions, labor law is governed by
statutory provisions compiled in labor “codes” that supplant almost
entirely the civil code law that would otherwise apply.28 Other
clarification of legal doctrine; simplicity and plain redaction for the citizenry;
certainty, justice and modernity; . . . rationalization, pedagogy, and utopia;
compression and reduction of legal norms; continuity and stability; popularization
of knowledge of the law and facilitation of practitioners’ search for authorities; and
exclusion of arbitrariness and the end of a shackling to tradition.
McAuley, supra note 16, at 265-66.
20. John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1868 (1988).
21. Id.
22. Jason Kilborn, Civil Codes and Consumers, 51 LOY. L. REV. 11, 14 (2005).
23. See H. Patrick Glenn, The Grounding of Codification, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 765,
770 (1998); McAuley, supra note 16, at 275.
24. See Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and Latin
America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (2009).
25. McAuley, supra note 16, at 275. Monikers proliferate as the statutes do
themselves. See Glenn, supra note 23, at 770 (“Hence, a new vocabulary of ‘pseudo-codes,’
‘codes suiveurs,’ and even ‘codes dangereux’ has emerged to designate the new body of codes
whose content, structure, and style would constitute a major departure from the classic
nineteenth century codes (themselves ‘veritable codes’).”).
26. See Merryman, supra note 20, at 1868-69; Hein Kötz, Civil Code Revision in
Continental Europe: The Experience in the Fields of Contract and Tort, 52 REV. JUR. U.P.R.
235, 236-37 (1983).
27. See Merryman, supra note 20, at 1868-69; Kötz, supra note 26, at 236-37.
28. See Kötz, supra note 26, at 236-37 (noting that in France and Germany, “it is
generally admitted today that labor law has virtually ‘emigrated’ from the civil codes”). In
France, labor law is presently governed primarily by the Code du travail. See CODE DU
TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] (Fr.). In contrast, German labor and employment law is not collected into
a single statutory volume; rather, the provisions of the German Civil Code are supplemented
by numerous statutory enactments relating to all manner of subjects, including collective
bargaining, leave, wages, training, and safety. See Liliane Jung, National Labour Law
Profile: Federal Republic of Germany, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (June 17, 2011), http://www.
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representative bodies of law now entirely removed from the civil code
framework in many civil law jurisdictions include intellectual property,
insurance, contracts of carriage, urban and agrarian leases, and
consumer protection, among others.29 As these bodies of specialized
law grow and evolve, the civil codes become ever more obsolete, at
least with respect to certain subject matters.30
Other special legislation is less cohesive, treating individual
issues within the law rather than seeking to regulate a particular
subject matter completely.31 These statutes either articulate particular
applications of the general code provisions or pronounce exceptions to
them.32 In either case, extracodal statutory laws not only supplant the
specific civil code provisions from which they derogate, but also
weaken the core principles underlying the code itself.33

B.

Statutory Law, Decodification, and Recodification

The proliferation of statutory law and its detraction from the civil
codes has led civilian scholars to denominate a phenomenon known as
“decodification.”34 At its heart, decodification can be understood as a
transference of focus from the civil code as the central source of law to
ilo.org/ifpdial/information-resources/national-labour-law-profiles/WCMS_158899/lang--en/
index.htm.
29. See Murillo, supra note 18, at 173 (observing that statutory law has been utilized
in civil law jurisdictions to regulate employment law, urban and agrarian leases, intellectual
property, insurance, contracts of carriage, competition, monopoly, and consumer protection
law); Mathias Reimann, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Reform of the German Law
of Obligations, 83 TUL. L. REV. 877, 882 (2009) (noting the use of special legislation to
provide remedies to consumers, regulate the employment relationship, and govern rights to
apartments and timeshares).
30. See Murillo, supra note 18, at 173; see also Kötz, supra note 26, at 237 (“The
code rules on the traditional master and servant relationship have therefore lost their
importance for the majority of employees, and the law relating to employment contracts is
now treated as an independent area of law both in the universities and in the legal literature.”).
31. See Kötz, supra note 26, at 237; Murillo, supra note 18, at 173.
32. See Kötz, supra note 26, at 237; Murillo, supra note 18, at 173.
33. See McAuley, supra note 16, at 274-75.
34. Decodification was first observed by Italian scholar Natalino Irti in his article
L’età della decodificazione. See Natalino Irti, L’età della decodificazione, in DIRITTO E
SOCIETÀ 613 (1978). Statutory law has been a principal contributor to decodification in
most, if not all, codified civil law jurisdictions. See, e.g., E.-M. MEIJERS, LA RÉFORME DU
CODE CIVIL NÉERLANDAIS 3-5 (1948) (Netherlands); Bergel, supra note 14, at 1093-97
(France); Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Towards the Reform of the Law of Obligations in France:
The Reasons for the Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 853, 859-60 (2009) (France); Marta FigueroaTorres, Recodification of Civil Law in Puerto Rico: A Quixotic Pursuit of the Civil Code for
the New Millennium, 23 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 143, 145-46 (2008) (Puerto Rico); Kötz, supra
note 26, 236-38 (Germany and France); McAuley, supra note 16, at 271 (Netherlands);
Moréteau & Parise, supra note 24, at 1125-61 (Latin America); Murillo, supra note 18, at
178-79 (Argentina and Peru).
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other external replacements.35 While statutory law is not the only code
“replacement” leading to decodification,36 its effects are significant.37
Statutory law creates “fissures” in the code as large portions of the law
are excised and housed elsewhere, or are simply overridden.38 The
code, rather than being the central and primary source of law, becomes
a law of last resort, consulted only if statutory law does not speak to a
particular legal dispute.39 The use of statutory law also invites
overactive legislation, an inundation which in turn further undermines
the stability and coherence of the legal system.40
When decodification has occurred, “recodification” is advocated
as a solution to bring unity back to the legal system.41 Generally,
recodification is a process involving the incorporation of special
legislation into the current code system.42 However, the task of
recodification is not a simple one, and indeed, the entire enterprise of

35. See Glenn, supra note 23, at 768-69 (“The particular laws and regimes multiply.
The common law may, or may not, be found in the codes.”); McAuley, supra note 16, at 274
(“[D]ecodification takes place when a code loses its status as the one and true source of the
private law.”).
36. Decodification is attributed to at least four forces beyond the proliferation of
statutory law. First is the growth of judge-made law. Particularly where code law is sparse, as
in the realm of torts, judicially developed rules and doctrines tend to obviate the need to
consult the civil code. See Merryman, supra note 20, at 1869; Murillo, supra note 18, at 173.
Second, the rise of the administrative state and its attendant explosion in executive and
administrative regulation has removed the focus from legislatures, and in turn, civil codes.
See Merryman, supra note 20, at 1869-70. Third, decodification has resulted from the growth
of constitutionalism. Whereas individual rights of the citizenry—to property, liberty, and
personality—were once guaranteed through the codes, today these rights are increasingly
secured by constitutional law. See id. at 1870-72; Murillo, supra note 18, at 174. Fourth, the
expansion of supranational law in all of its forms—international treaties, conventions, and
European Community directives—obscures the centrality of code law. See Merryman, supra
note 20, at 1872-73; Murillo, supra note 18, at 174.
37. See Murillo, supra note 18, at 164.
38. Id. (quoting Luis Diez-Picazo & Ponce de Leon, Codificación, descodificación y
recodificación, 45 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 475, 478 (Apr.-June 1992) (Spain)).
39. See Murillo, supra note 18, at 172-73 (implying that special legislation becomes
the primary source of law, rendering the code only relevant when statutes or judge-made law
do not cover a particular area).
40. See Figueroa-Torres, supra note 34, at 146 (“Acquiescence to legislative inflation,
instability and opacity of norms is a threat to juridical certainty, one of the most appreciated
values of law, which in turn depends on the stability, uniformity, and coherence of norms.”).
41. See Moréteau & Parise, supra note 24, at 1107 (“When the law is decodified, by
revision of the code or addition of too many revision statutes, a recodification process is
sometimes advocated as the only means of bringing back unity to a system that has lost the
gravity it once had.”); see also, e.g., Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 34, at 861 (recommending
recodification of French obligations law to “avoid an excessive dispersion of the law of
contract”).
42. See Murillo, supra note 18, at 175.
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recodification is controversial.43 No single, agreed-upon methodology
exists.44 In some jurisdictions, recodification is achieved through
partial revision of the law.45 In other places, large-scale reform is
achieved through the supplanting of old codes with entirely new ones.46
Recodification may involve mere structural reform—a compilation of
disparate rules into an organized system.47 In other circumstances,
recodification may take on the more ambitious task of incorporating
decodified law into the structural and philosophical framework of a
code.48 Only the latter involves recommitment to the traditional ideals
of codification.49
Regardless of the method of recodification employed, once it is
completed, a substantial amount of ancillary legislation often
remains.50 This should not be perceived as an indication that
recodification has somehow failed. Some measure of extracodal
legislation will always be required to elaborate rules that are subject to
frequent revision, so as not to disrupt the integrity of the now-reformed
code. Additionally, a perhaps unpleasant reality exists that politically
motivated special-interest legislation will, when passed, be housed
outside of the code rather than integrated into its fabric.51 Moreover,
there exists a view that some special legislation must always exist
outside of the code because a true “unity of private law” no longer
exists.52 According to this perspective, whereas private law was once
motivated by a single philosophy, today a plurality of ideologies
43. See id.
44. See McAuley, supra note 16, at 262 (“Recodification . . . is unexplored.”).
45. See Murillo, supra note 18, at 176 (“France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Swiss [sic]
and Spain have revised and reformed partially their ancient civil codes covering major civil
areas as family law, property law, individual rights, etc.”).
46. See id. at 176 n.75, 179 (“[S]everal civil law countries pursued global reforms
drafting a second and a third generation of new codes that repealed the old ones.”).
47. See GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 770 (8th ed. 2007) (“Recodification: . . . Regroupement dans un code de lois postérieures qui lui étaient demeurées
extérieures; réincorporation de loi spéciales éparses relatives à une matière. Comp.
Codification à droit constant.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
48. See id. (“Recodification: Rénovation d’un code par la refonte de parties
importantes de sa structure; réforme s’apparentant, en reprise, à une codification réelle.”);
McAuley, supra note 16, at 262 (“Recodification is a reconstruction of a systematic,
synthetic, and syncretic approach to law. . . . Recodification, like codification, has its central
ideas.” (citation omitted)).
49. See Moréteau & Parise, supra note 24, at 1110.
50. For example, in France today there are over forty-six different codes in addition to
the Code civil. See id. at 1109; Les Codes en Vigueur, LEGIFRANCE, http://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/initRechCodeArticle.do (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (providing a drop-down menu
listing France’s various codes).
51. See Kötz, supra note 26, at 247.
52. See id. at 246.
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motivates the law governing interpersonal relationships.53 Thus, the
argument goes, the law governing contracts entered between
merchants and consumers must necessarily be separated—both
physically and ideologically—from the law governing commercial
transactions.54
However, while it is generally conceded that some special
legislation is inevitable for reasons practical, ideological, or political in
nature, advocates of recodification insist that it ought to be kept to an
absolute minimum.55 Moreover, because code law and statutory law
must ultimately coexist within the same legal sphere, ancillary statutes
should be read in light of simultaneously applicable civil code
provisions.56 The jurist must never forget that statutory law is not “an
autonomous world for itself.”57 Although the code is no longer the sole,
or even primary, source of law, it must be understood that it contains
the general principles upon which the legal system is founded, along
with the rules that will apply by default in the absence of special
legislation on point.58 Therefore, the statutory rules that contradict the
code must be applied restrictively so that they are not allowed to
encroach excessively upon the broader general principles of the law.59
The maxim exceptio est strictissimae interpretationis is applicable
here—special statutes must be interpreted narrowly and according to
their distinct legislative purpose, and must not be enlarged by
analogy.60

53. Id.
54. Id. But see Blanc-Jouvan, supra note 34, at 859-60 (suggesting that the
absorption of special legislation governing consumer transactions into the French law of
obligations “might be an important step in the direction of greater contractual fairness”).
55. See, e.g., Franz Bydlinski, Civil Law Codification and Special Legislation, in
QUESTIONS OF CIVIL LAW CODIFICATION 25, 32-33 (1990); Kötz, supra note 26, at 247.
56. See Bydlinski, supra note 55, at 32-33; Olivier Moréteau, An Introduction to
Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 9, 13 (2010). In Quebec, this principle has been codified as
law. The preliminary provision of the 1991 Civil Code provides in part:
The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all matters within the letter,
spirit, or object of its provisions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by
implication. In these matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws, although
other laws may complement the Code or make exceptions to it.
Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Preliminary Provision (Can.). Professor Olivier
Moréteau has advocated in his writing for the adoption of similar legislation in the
preliminary title of the Louisiana Civil Code. See Moréteau, supra, at 15; Moréteau, supra
note 13, at 65-66.
57. Bydlinski, supra note 55, at 33.
58. See Moréteau, supra note 56, at 13.
59. Id.
60. Bydlinski, supra note 55, at 33; Moréteau, supra note 56, at 13.
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III. STATUTORY LAW AND CODE LAW IN LOUISIANA
Thus, statutory law pervades the civil law tradition, and its
judicious use is at least begrudgingly accepted, if not occasionally
welcomed, provided caution is exercised both in its enactment and its
application. With this outlook in mind, it is possible to evaluate with
some clarity Louisiana’s experience with statutory law and the
attempts of reformers at recodification.

A. The Proliferation of Statutory Law
During the first years following the Louisiana Purchase, most of
Louisiana’s private law was contained within the Civil Code.61 This
state of affairs was short-lived, however, as over time the Louisiana
legislature enacted voluminous amounts of special legislation that
served to supplement or, in many instances, supplant Civil Code
provisions.62 The Civil Code of 1870 largely improved the situation, at
least temporarily, because its principal drafter included in the revision
many of the legislative enactments passed since the 1825 Code had
been enacted.63
In the years following the promulgation of the 1870 Code,
statutory law “accumulated at a prodigious rate and with little rhyme
or reason.”64 By the midpoint of the last century, the body of
legislation existing outside of the Civil Code was a jumbled mess—a
tangle of over twelve thousand separate enactments, often
contradictory, sometimes completely obsolete.65 These statutes
encompassed all manner of topics covering both private and public
law.66 Statutory interpretation, labor and employment law, workers’
compensation, corporate law, taxation, and criminal law were all
touched upon.67 In order to remedy what had become an unsustainable
61. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost Cause?, 54 TUL. L. REV. 830,
837 (1980).
62. See id.
63. Charles E. Fenner, The Genesis and Descent of the System of Civil Law
Prevailing in Louisiana, in K.A. CROSS, A TREATISE, ANALYTICAL, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL
ON SUCCESSIONS, at vii (1891); Moréteau & Parise, supra note 24, at 1116 (citing JOHN RAY,
THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA: REVISED, ARRANGED AND AMENDED, at vii-viii
(1869)); John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 280, 295 (1932).
A prominent example of one of the statutes “absorbed” into the 1870 code is the
usufruct of the surviving spouse in community. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 916 (1870); 1844 La.
Acts 99.
64. Dale E. Bennett, Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, 11 LA. L. REV. 4, 4 (1950).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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state of affairs, the Louisiana legislature in 1942 directed the Law
Institute to “prepare a comprehensive revision” of the statutory law.68
This project was not meant to effect any reform of the law, but instead
was merely intended to reorganize and synthesize existing statutory
law, and in the words of the Law Institute, “to bring some semblance of
order out of chaos.”69 The result was the compilation now referred to
as the Revised Statutes of 1950.70

B.

Statutory Law and the Rolling Revision

Although the compilation of statutory law into a single
compendium partially ameliorated the state of disorder characterizing
those rules, the proliferation of statutory law outside of the Civil Code
caused more than mere organizational problems. In particular, the
many statutes bearing on civil law matters began to obscure the legal
precepts in the Code itself.71 The confusion wrought by statutory law
was compounded by other difficulties faced by the aging Code of
1870. Not only had a large body of jurisprudence grown up around its
many provisions, but much of its conceptual framework was simply
outdated in light of evolving societal conditions.72 Recognizing the

68. The legislature directed the Law Institute to “prepare a comprehensive revision of
the Statutes of the State of a general character . . . including those contained within the
revision of 1870” to simplify their language; to correct their incongruities; to supply their
deficiencies; to arrange them in order, the sections thereof being numbered so as to provide
for additions and amendments; and to reduce them to one connected text. 1942 La. Acts 136.
69. Bennett, supra note 64, at 5-6 & n.2 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN., at xiii (1950));
see also William E. Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana State Law Institute
Recognizes 70-Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments, 56 LA. B.J. 85, 90
(2008) (“Since the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1950, the practicing bar and the courts
have been able to rely upon an organized set of statutes.”).
70. Bennett, supra note 64, at 4-5. Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 1, section 16,
states:
The Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 shall be construed as continuations of and
substitutes for the laws or parts of laws whereof are revised and consolidated
herein. The adoption of these Revised Statutes shall not affect the continued
existence and operation, subject to the provisions hereof, of any department,
agency, or office heretofore legally established or held, nor any acts done, any
funds established, any rights acquired or accruing, any taxes or other charges
incurred or imposed, any penalties incurred or imposed, or any judicial proceedings
had or commenced prior to the effective date of these Revised Statutes.
LA. REV. STAT. § 1:16 (2013).
71. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE
LAW § 70, at 76 (2d ed. 1999).
72. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative Essay, 78
TUL. L. REV. 379, 396 (2003).
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Civil Code’s decline, the Louisiana legislature in 1948 directed the
Law Institute to undertake a large-scale revision of the document.73
Before the revision could begin, the Law Institute was faced with
the decision whether to perform a mere revision of the law or a true
recodification.74 The former, mere revision, would involve “bringing
the text of the Code up to date in the light of judicial precedents and
special legislation bearing on civil law matters” with “no major
changes in organization and policies.”75 The latter, true recodification,
would consist of “substantial revision” of the Code “with regard to
structure, determination of policies, and drafting of new provisions.”76
Ultimately, the Law Institute settled upon an approach lying between
these two extremes, but closely approximating true recodification.77 To
accomplish its purpose, the Law Institute chose to engage in a series of
incremental revisions over the course of time—a rolling revision—as
opposed to a single overhaul of the entire Civil Code.78 A global
revision was simply an impossible task for a volunteer law reform
commission such as the Law Institute.79 Title-by-title revision began in
the 1970s and continues today.80
Once the rolling revision was well under way, Professor Vernon
Palmer famously questioned whether the Civil Code had been
transmuted through the revision process into a “mere” digest of laws.
In his article “The Death of a Code—The Birth of a Digest,” Palmer’s
central observation was that the revision process had largely failed to
effect a clean break from past Civil Code articles.81 According to
Palmer, this problem stemmed primarily from the construction of the
provisions’ enabling statutes, which did not clearly repeal prior law.82
Palmer additionally complained that revised code provisions had been
crafted to coexist with a body of jurisprudence predicated on the old
law, thus carrying forward not only the prior articles as a type of
73. See 1948 La. Acts 810; Yiannopoulos, supra note 72, at 396-97. This was not the
first call for revision of the Civil Code of 1870. A prior 1910 draft revision commissioned by
the Louisiana legislature was ultimately rejected. See Lovett, supra note 1, at 626.
74. Yiannopoulos, supra note 11, at LX.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Crawford & Haymon, supra note 69, at 89.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 91. As of this writing, most of the Civil Code has undergone substantive
revision. For a comprehensive listing of the portions of the code updated as of this writing,
see Yiannopoulos, supra note 11, at LX-LXIII.
81. Palmer, Death of a Code, supra note 6, at 224.
82. Id. at 235.
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“shadow code,” but the judge-made law as well.83 At its core,
Professor Palmer’s argument “raised the question of whether the then
half-complete process of revising the Civil Code was actually
undermining and unnecessarily complicating Louisiana’s civil law
system, rather than modernizing, clarifying, and streamlining the
law.”84 Palmer’s critique of the revision process sparked a scholarly
debate regarding the very nature of civil codes and their interaction
with other sources of law.85
Although this most recent great debate regarding the primacy of
the Civil Code over other, subsidiary sources of law has persisted for
nearly a quarter of a century, the focus has been predominantly on the
interaction among the revised Civil Code articles, their predecessors,
and the jurisprudence interpreting them.86 On the other hand, little
attention has been paid to the relationship between the revised Civil
Code and external statutory law, despite the fact that the simplification
of this relationship was one of the primary goals of the revision. Thus,
a question remains whether “recodification”—in any sense—of
Louisiana statutory law (as opposed to jurisprudential or other sources
of law) has been accomplished.87
Now that the revision is winding down, it is clear that the bulk of
Louisiana law is still to be found in the Louisiana Revised Statues, not
in the Civil Code.88 Indeed, there are fifty-six separate titles in the
Louisiana Revised Statutes.89 Much of the legislation found within
those titles is parsed out into individual “mini-codes,” cohesive
systems governing entire subject matters within the private law.
Examples include the Mineral Code,90 the Insurance Code,91 and the
Commercial Code.92 These statutes are arranged, much as common
law codes, in alphabetical order, ranging from Aeronautics93 to Wildlife
and Fisheries.94
83. Id. at 224.
84. Lovett, supra note 1, at 619.
85. For an excellent summary of this discourse, see id. at 645-52.
86. See Cueto-Rua, supra note 6; Dennis et al., supra note 6; Lovett, supra note 1, at
618; Palmer, Revision of the Code, supra note 6; Palmer, Death of a Code, supra note 6.
87. See Moréteau & Parise, supra note 24, at 1120.
88. Id. (“The big bulk of legislation in Louisiana is to be found in the Revised
Statutes.”).
89. This figure does not include the numerous volumes of court rules that are
associated with, but not included within, Title 13—Courts and Judicial Procedure.
90. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:1-:217 (2013).
91. Id. §§ 22:1-:2382.
92. Id. §§ 10:1-101 to :9-809.
93. Id. §§ 2:1-:1004.
94. Id. §§ 56:1-:2037.
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However, in light of the experience of foreign jurisdictions with
efforts at the recodification of law, the persistence of large volumes of
statutory law in Louisiana should not be viewed as a failure of
process.95 Rather, much of this legislation is not only necessary, but
also is clearly inappropriate for inclusion within a civil code. For one
thing, a good deal of the law contained within the Louisiana Revised
Statutes is of a public nature.96 Criminal law, state administration,
taxation, and other such matters have traditionally been treated outside
of the Civil Code, whose purview is restricted to matters of private
law.97 Even certain private law topics are sensibly excised from the
code for treatment by special legislation. Louisiana’s Mineral Code,
for example, though derived from Civil Code principles, extends those
rules in a most specialized, sui generis manner.98 Other matters,
particularly those commercial in nature, are far too technical and
complex to be incorporated into the framework of the Civil Code.
Thus, although the volume of statutory law continues to grow, its
expansion permits the adoption of highly specialized legislation
without disturbing the elegance and simplicity of the Civil Code.

C.

The Anomalous Interaction Between Code and Statute

The more troublesome portion of the Revised Statutes, at least
from a methodological perspective, is Title 9. During the 1950
reorganization of statutory law, it was discovered that many statutes
relating directly to the Civil Code of 1870 had been enacted
independently rather than as amendments to the appropriate Code
articles.99 These statutes were compiled into a single volume, referred
to as the Civil Code Ancillaries.100 This compilation was unique
among the Revised Statutes of 1950 because it, more so than any of
the others, was intended to supplement and complement the Civil

95. Id.; see Murillo, supra note 18, at 176 (discussing multiple countries that have
engaged in recodification).
96. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14, 49 (governing criminal law and state administration).
97. See id.; Moréteau & Parise, supra note 24, at 1111.
98. 3 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PERSONAL SERVITUDES
§ 2:19 (5th ed. 2011) (“The Mineral Code has been conceived as a specialized extension of
the Civil Code in matters of mineral law. Therefore, it must be interpreted and applied as a
true code against the background of the Civil Code and the Louisiana civilian tradition.”).
99. Bennett, supra note 64, at 10.
100. See id. Professor Bennett noted that the compilation of Title 9 was facilitated by
a prior 1942 report of the Law Institute, under the direction of Reporter Professor Harriet S.
Daggett, compiling “Louisiana Statutes Related to the Civil Code.” See id. at 10 n.16.
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Code directly, almost as an extension of the primary text.101 To
facilitate their use, the redactors arranged these provisions in a
preliminary title and three books—Persons, Things, and Modes of
Acquiring Things.102 Further subdivision was made into titles and
chapters corresponding to the structure of the Civil Code.103 Within
this edifice, some of these ancillary provisions were themselves
assembled into “mini-codes” contained within the larger work, such as
the Trust Estates Act, a rudimentary trust code enacted in 1938.104
Others were isolated provisions, handling various matters of Civil
Code purview without any cohesive strength or purpose.105
The rolling revision has not changed the variety of content found
within Title 9. Still to be found are numerous “satellite” codes, selfcontained works designed to treat matters once addressed by the Code,
but whose policies are at least in part at odds with traditional code
principles. These include the Trust Code,106 the Consumer Credit
Law,107 the Louisiana Condominium Act,108 and the Louisiana Lease of
Movables Act.109 Other provisions articulate detailed schemes
designed to effectuate Code principles.110 Though not at odds with the
Civil Code, their level of particularity makes them unsuitable for
placement within the Code itself. The child support guidelines provide
an excellent example of legislation of this sort.111 Still other provisions
are of a third type—isolated rules announcing particularized
applications of,112 or exceptions to, Code principles.113 At times, these
101. See id. at 10 n.16; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Preliminary Title, cmt. (1950)
(“As indicated by the word Ancillaries, Title 9 of the Revised Statutes of 1950 is auxiliary to
the Civil Code of Louisiana.”).
102. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. (1950).
103. Bennett, supra note 64, at 10.
104. See id.; John Minor Wisdom, A Trust Code in the Civil Law, Based on the
Restatement and Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trust Estates Act, 13 TUL. L. REV. 70, 70
(1938).
105. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 64, at 10 (noting that various married women’s
emancipatory statutes were grouped by subject matter under the heading “Married Women”).
106. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:1721-9:2252 (2013).
107. Id. §§ 9:3510-:3577.5. The Consumer Credit Law provides detailed regulations
for consumer loans and permits much higher interest rates than are permitted by the
provisions of the Civil Code title “On Loan.” See Kilborn, supra note 22, at 12-13.
108. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1121.101-:1124.115.
109. Id. §§ 9:3301-:3342.
110. Id. §§ 9:315-:315.19.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., id. § 9:1254 (providing for forced passage over a waterway on
neighboring property).
113. Compare id. § 9:211 (permitting marriage between collaterals within the fourth
degree under certain circumstances) with LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 90 (2013) (prohibiting
generally marriage between collaterals within the fourth degree); compare LA. REV. STAT.
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provisions are designed to work justice in unique situations where the
application of Code law unexpectedly fails to do so. More
disappointing are the statutes designed by good politics, rather than by
good policy.114
Not all ancillary or supplemental legislation is antithetical or
detrimental to the Civil Code. Numerous legal issues are sensibly
dealt with outside its ambit.115 However, much of the legislation found
within the Civil Code Ancillaries is far from salutary. So many poorly
conceived and hastily drafted statutes are found there that Title 9 has
come to be known as the “dumping place” of special legislation.116 A
great potential exists for unintended and undesirable conflict between
core principles of the Civil Code and this type of statutory law, and
sadly, this potential is all too often realized. It is not uncommon for
Louisiana judges, under the influence of the common law
methodology, to forget the maxims of interpretation generally
applicable to revised statutes.117 Statutory law is applied as if it were
autonomous, without reference to the Civil Code provisions against
which it ought to be read or the purpose for which it was originally
enacted.118 Divorced from both cause and context, these rules are
allowed to do grave damage to the fabric of the Code.
§ 9:406 (providing time limitations for revocation of authentic act of acknowledgment of
paternity) with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 & cmt. D (providing for acknowledgment of
paternity by authentic act the revocation of which is subject to no explicit time periods);
compare LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1106 (providing for the de-immobilization of certain storage
tanks placed on the land of another) with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 465-466 (providing for the
immobilization of things incorporated into a tract of land and component parts of buildings
and other constructions).
114. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:211 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of Civil Code
Article 90, marriages between collaterals within the fourth degree, fifty-five years of age or
older, which were entered into on or before December 31, 1992, shall be considered legal and
the enactment hereof shall in no way impair vested property rights.”). Professor Katherine
Spaht describes this statute as “special legislation designed for two constituents.” Katherine
Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law from the
Regulation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REV. 243, 260 n.85 (2003).
115. For example, see the Insurance Code. LA. REV. STAT. § 22:1-:2371.
116. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 61, at 843 (“The Revised Statutes have become the
‘dumping place of legislation considered to be ancillary to the Civil Code.’”); see also
Yiannopoulos, supra note 72, at 403 (“The corrosive force is the adoption and inclusion of
. . . comprehensive statutes into Title 9 that incorporate Uniform Acts of common law vintage
and ‘frequently conflict[] with the rules, principles, and policies of the Civil Code, which
must be regarded as impliedly repealed.’” (quoting Yiannopoulos, supra note 61, at 843)).
117. Moréteau, supra note 56, at 14; see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 9-13 (2013); LA.
REV. STAT. §§ 1:2-:17.
118. See Moréteau, supra note 56, at 14; Rodriguez v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 618 So.
2d 390, 394 (La. 1993) (“[A] statute which is in derogation of common or natural rights is to
be strictly construed and not extended beyond its obvious meaning.”).
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IV. A CASE STUDY: LESSOR’S WARRANTY AND STATUTORY
WAIVER
The anomalous interaction between code law and statutory law
thus described is, by its nature, best studied in the context of specific
examples. In light of the foregoing discussion, the remainder of this
Article examines a particular conflict between the Louisiana Civil
Code and the Civil Code Ancillaries that has emerged in the law of
lease. The statutory culprit in this tale is R.S. 9:3221, an isolated
provision that addresses the potential liability of an owner of
“premises” who has both leased the property to a tenant and shifted
responsibility for the condition of the premises to the lessee.119
As will be revealed, this statute, originally enacted to serve a
narrow legislative purpose, has at various times in its eighty-year
history threatened to undo core principles of code law relating to the
limits of contractual freedom.120 Because of insufficient understanding
of the provision’s scope and history, courts and the redactors of the
rolling revision have both repeatedly failed to harmonize the statute
with code provisions.121 The consequence is that a key component of
the law of lease—that is, the lessor’s responsibility for the condition of
the leased premises—is currently governed by a tangle of conflicting
rules. Rather than modernizing, clarifying, and streamlining the law of
lease, the rolling revision has introduced unnecessary confusion and,
unwittingly, perpetuated obsolescent policies underlying the
responsibilities of lessors and lessees.

A. Lessor Liability in Contract and in Tort—An Overview
Because R.S. 9:3221 regulates waivers of a lessor’s obligations,
an exploration of the statute necessarily must begin with an overview
of the lessor’s obligations themselves. Potentially, a lessor’s liability
for defects in the leased premises lies both in contract and in tort.122
First, Louisiana Civil Code article 2696 (formerly 2695) provides,
119. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3221. The statute provides in full:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2699, the owner of
premises leased under a contract whereby the lessee assumes responsibility for
their condition is not liable for injury caused by any defect therein to the lessee or
anyone on the premises who derives his right to be thereon from the lessee, unless
the owner knew or should have known of the defect or had received notice thereof
and failed to remedy it within a reasonable time.
120. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
121. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
122. See infra notes 123, 130, 137-139 and accompanying text.

442

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:423

“The lessor warrants the lessee that the thing is suitable for the purpose
for which it was leased and that it is free of vices or defects that
prevent its use for that purpose.”123 The warranty applies both to
defects present in the property at the inception of the lease and those
that arise thereafter, provided they are not attributable to the fault of the
lessee.124 The warranty also encompasses defects both known and not
known to the lessor.125
Breach of the warranty entitles the lessee to the full range of
remedies generally allowed for breach of contract.126 If the defect is so
severe that the premises no longer serve the purpose for which they
were leased, the lessee may obtain dissolution of the lease.127 If repairs
are needed, the lessee may notify the lessor, and upon the lessor’s
failure to act, the lessee may make the repairs himself and deduct the
costs of doing so from the rent.128 The lessee may also seek damages
resulting from a vice or defect in the premises.129
Additionally, a lessor is answerable in delict (tort) for the
condition of the leased premises in his capacity as owner or custodian
of the thing leased. Under article 2317.1, which deals with liability for
“custody” or “garde” of a thing, the lessor of a building is “answerable
for damage occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect.”130 Article 2322,
addressing the responsibility of an owner of a building, imposes
liability for “damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by
neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice or defect in its

123. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2696 (2013); see also ALAIN LEVASSEUR & DAVID
GRUNING, LOUISIANA LAW OF SALE AND LEASE: A PRÉCIS § 3.1.2 (2007) (“The idea of a
defect in the thing is linked to the purpose for which the thing is leased. Thus, the lessor first
warrants that the thing is right for the lessee’s acknowledged purpose or cause.”).
124. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2696.
125. Id. arts. 2696-2697; see also LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 123, § 3.1.2
(illustrating a scenario where a lessor’s warranty would be extended to a defect of which the
lessor was unaware).
126. See LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 123, § 3.1.2.
127. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2719; see also GEORGE M. ARMSTRONG, JR., LOUISIANA
LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW § 7.1 (Catherine Kirgis Kuhlman Supp. 1995).
128. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2691, 2694; ARMSTRONG, supra note 127, § 7.3.
129. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1994-2003. Prior to the 2005 revision of the title
“Lease,” article 2695 specifically required the lessor to indemnify the lessor for “any loss”
resulting from a vice or defect in the leased thing. Id. art. 2695 (2004) (“[I]f any loss should
result to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify him for
the same.”); see also ARMSTRONG, supra note 127, § 7.3 (“The tenant may sue for damages
for breach of implied warranty.”). Although revised article 2696 makes no reference to “loss”
suffered by the lessee, it does not appear that any change in the law was intended.
130. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2317.1 (2013).
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original construction.”131 Also applicable is article 660 (formerly 670),
which appears in the title of the Civil Code dealing with legal
servitudes, and which provides that an “owner is bound to keep his
buildings in repair so that neither their fall nor that of any part of their
materials may cause damage to a neighbor or to a passerby.”132
Together, these provisions make the lessor who is also the owner or
custodian of the property responsible not only to his tenant, but to
anyone who is injured by a defect in the premises.
Article 2697 makes clear that the lessor’s contractual warranty
imposes a strict liability standard—the lessor is liable for damage
caused by a vice or defect in the leased thing regardless of whether the
lessor knew of those defects.133 Thus, in order to recover damages for
breach of this warranty, the lessee must prove only that a defect existed
and that the defect caused damages.134 Historically, the lessor’s
delictual liability as owner or custodian was also assessed according to
a strict liability standard.135 However, in 1996, the Louisiana legislature
introduced landmark legislation eliminating the strict liability formerly
imposed on property owners and replacing it with liability for
negligence only.136 The new provisions contain parallel language
making clear that an owner or custodian is liable “only upon a showing
that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known
of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the damage
could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that
he failed to exercise such reasonable care.”137 In contrast to this
change, the articles providing for the lessor’s contractual liability were
left untouched. Thus, while the lessor’s delictual responsibilities as
131. Id. art. 2322. Unlike article 660, article 2322 is not restricted to an injured
“neighbor” or “passerby,” but applies also to anyone lawfully on the premises. Ciaccio v.
Carbajal, 76 So. 583, 584 (La. 1917); Cristadoro v. Von Behren’s Heirs, 44 So. 852, 854-55
(La. 1907).
132. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 660.
133. Id. art. 2697.
134. Wood v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 486 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1986); John C. Morris, Jr., Comment, Lessor’s Liability for Personal Injuries, 7 LA. L. REV.
406, 408 (1947).
135. Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Burying Caesar: Civil Justice
Reform and the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 339, 342-43, 350-51,
368-69 (1996). Under prior law, the lessor’s negligence also served as a basis for recovery in
appropriate cases. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 127, § 8.5.
136. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 135, at 342.
137. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2317.1; see also id. arts. 660, 2322 (exhibiting the same
language changes, minus the word “ruin,” by saying “only upon a showing that he knew or, in
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the vice or defect which caused the
damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and
that he failed to exercise such reasonable care”).
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owner or custodian of a building are now assessed according to a
negligence standard, a lessor’s liability in contract remains strict.138
The contractual and delictual obligations are imposed upon the
lessor concurrently, so that an injured lessee may recover under either
theory, or both.139 However, an injured lessee is most likely to allege a
violation of the lessor’s contractual responsibilities. This has been the
case historically140 and remains true under current law, likely because
the contractual action is generally far more advantageous to the
lessee.141 As noted above, the lessor is strictly liable for a breach of the
warranty against vices and defects, while liability in tort lies in
negligence alone.142 Additionally, the lessee’s breach of warranty claim
is subject to a generous ten-year period of prescription, as opposed to

138. Montecino v. Bunge Corp., 04-875, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/15/05); 895 So. 2d
603, 605-07 (quoting Barnes v. Riverwood Apartments P’ship, 38,331, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/7/04); 870 So. 2d 490, 494-95 (finding that tort reform legislation reducing tort standard of
care to negligence did not impact strict liability standard of care applicable to lessors in
contract)).
Of course, in addition to articles 660, 2317.1, and 2322, article 2315 serves as a source
of delictual liability for lessors whose “fault” in failing to repair known defects in leased
premises results in “damage to another.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315. Given that the other
provisions address liability for owners and custodians more specifically and, until recently,
imposed a more stringent standard of liability, article 2315 is rarely referred to by litigants or
courts when defining the lessor’s delictual obligations.
139. See Barnes, 38,331 at p. 10; 870 So. 2d at 497 (“Having decided that Mr. Barnes
has a strict liability claim under article 2695, we also note that plaintiffs like Mr. Barnes are
not limited to actions under article 2695, but, in appropriate factual contexts, may be entitled
to recovery via the negligence route under articles 2317 and 2317.1.”); Evans v. Does, 283
So. 2d 804, 807 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1973) (recognizing tenant’s cause of action exists both ex
contractu and ex delicto).
Louisiana courts have sometimes required litigants whose complaints established the
possibility of recovery in both contract and in tort to choose the theory under which the case
will be decided. This approach is improper in light of article 862 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure, which suppresses the “theory of the case” doctrine. See LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 862 & cmt. (b) (2013); 6 SAÚL LITVINOFF, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE,
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 16.20 (1999). Under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
862, courts are required to “grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain
no prayer for general and equitable relief.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 862; see also Fed.
Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 263 So. 2d 871, 874 (La. 1972) (Tate, J., concurring) (“A
plaintiff who pleads and proves the necessary facts should be allowed to recover under any
available theory, whether tort, quasi contract, or contract. To bar recovery simply by strictly
construing the pleadings is to abandon the spirit of the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure.”).
140. See Ben R. Miller, Jr., Comment, Responsibility of Landlord and Tenant for
Damages from Defects in Leased Premises, 20 LA. L. REV. 76, 79 (1959) (“Although the
language of [article 2322] does not preclude recovery by tenants, it has been customary for
only third persons injured by defects in the premises to make use of this provision.”).
141. See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text.
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the one-year period applicable to delictual claims.143 Moreover,
Louisiana courts have traditionally awarded damages for all types of
harm resulting from breach of the lessor’s contractual warranty,
including damages for economic loss,144 loss of property,145 personal
injury,146 and nonpecuniary damages for mental anguish, anxiety, and
worry.147
143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3492, 3499. Although the plaintiff should by all rights
have the option to pursue his claim for personal injuries as a breach of contract claim,
Louisiana courts have erroneously characterized such claims as arising ex delicto and thus
governed by the one-year, as opposed to the ten-year, prescriptive period. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Battard, 523 So. 2d 7, 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1988); Singleton v. Sims, 438 So. 2d
633 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1983). The reasoning in these cases appears to originate from the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s 1904 decision in Schoppel v. Daly. 36 So. 322 (La. 1904).
There, the court was called upon to determine the nature of a claim levied against a lessor for
personal injuries suffered by a tenant’s wife. Id. at 325. Upon assuming that the wife was not
a signatory to the contract, the court concluded that her claim was therefore grounded in tort
rather than in contract. Id. Later decisions have relied on Daly to hold, improperly, that an
“action by a lessee against a lessor for damages caused by defects in the leased premises” is
an action ex delicto rather than ex contractu and therefore subject to a prescriptive period of
one year. Washington, 523 So. 2d at 7; Singleton, 438 So. 2d at 635.
144. See, e.g., Laura’s Prods., Inc. v. 600 Conti St., LLC, 2007-0819, pp. 10-12 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 4/9/08); 982 So. 2d 934, 940-41.
145. See, e.g., Nickens v. McGehee, 184 So. 2d 271, 276-77 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1966).
146. See Bates v. Blitz, 17 So. 2d 816, 820 (La. 1944); Barnes v. Riverwood
Apartments P’ship, 43,798, p. 19 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/04/09); 16 So. 3d 361; McGinty v.
Pesson, 96-850, p. 8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/11/96); 685 So. 2d 541, 545; Wexler v. Occhipinti,
378 So. 2d 1073, 1081 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1979); Kepper v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 340 So. 2d 1033,
1034 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1976); Revon v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 354, 359
(La. App. 4 Cir. 1973); Tewis v. Zurich Ins. Co., 233 So. 2d 357, 361 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1970);
Johnson v. Crescent Arms Apartments, Inc., 221 So. 2d 633, 638 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1969);
Estes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 157 So. 395, 403 (La. App. Orleans 1934); see also Schoppel
v. Daly, 36 So. 322 (La. 1904) (rejecting, in dicta, an argument that article 2695, predecessor
to article 2696, which sets forth lessor’s warranty against vices and defects, does not extend to
damages for personal injuries).
147. See, e.g., Gele v. Markey, 387 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (La. 1980); Tidwell v. Meyer
Bros., Ltd., 107 So. 571, 575 (La. 1926); Ganheart v. Exec. House Apartments, 95-1278, pp.
6-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/15/96); 671 So. 2d 525, 529-30; Gennings v. Newton, 567 So. 2d 637,
642 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990); Smith v. Castro Bros., 443 So. 2d 660, 661 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1983); Evans v. Does, 283 So. 2d 804, 807 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1973); Nacol v. WAIL, Inc., 219
So. 2d 333, 338 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1969); Nickens, 184 So. 2d at 278-79.
Although article 1998 now limits the circumstances in which nonpecuniary damages
may be recovered for breach of contracts, it seems clear that at least in residential leases, the
contract is one “intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest,” of which the lessor “either knew
or should have known”—i.e., the enjoyment of a habitable dwelling. See, e.g., Ganheart, 951278 at pp. 6-7; 671 So. 2d at 529-30 (“A lease for residential purposes includes, as one of its
objects, the enjoyment of habitable living quarters, arguably a nonpecuniary interest.”
(quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1998 (1990))). Furthermore, because the warranty against
vices and defects is implied in all lease contracts, it may even be argued that even commercial
leases involve interests of human safety significant enough to justify nonpecuniary damages
resulting from personal injury. On the other hand, where commercial lessees suffer emotional
distress unrelated to physical harm, recovery of nonpecuniary damages could be limited to
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While an injured lessee is entitled to recover under either contract
or tort principles, when third parties to the lease claim damage
resulting from defects in the premises, tort is generally the only theory
of recovery available. The warranty, being contractual in nature,
traditionally extended only to the lessee.148 Thus, under prior law, a
nonsignatory to the lease who was injured on the premises was
restricted to a tort claim against the lessor.149 The distinction between
the contract and tort claims, particularly the disparity in the standard of
liability, was a source of serious potential unfairness, especially for the
lessee’s spouse and children who resided in the house but who did not
sign the lease contract.150 To remedy this unfairness, article 2698 was
revised in 2005 to extend the lessor’s contractual obligations to “all
persons who reside in the premises in accordance with the lease.”151
However, other invitees and passersby remain outside of the protective
scope of the contractual warranty and are limited to claims in tort only.
A paradigmatic example best illustrates the operation of the
foregoing principles. Assume that a residential lessee executes a lease
for a house.152 The lessee moves into the premises with his wife and
minor child, neither of whom are signatories to the lease. Shortly after
the family moves in, the house catches fire. The lessee, his wife, and
his child suffer serious injuries. All of their possessions are destroyed.
A friend who was visiting their home is injured. An investigation
reveals that faulty wiring located inside of the walls of the house
caused the fire.
Under these facts, the lessor is potentially liable both in contract
and in tort. First, the faulty wiring constitutes a defect for which the

those cases where the lessee could show that the contract was made to gratify a nonpecuniary
interest other than commercial success and that the lessor either knew or should have known
of that interest. For general discussion of the availability of nonpecuniary damages in
Louisiana, see Vernon Valentine Palmer, Contracts of Intellectual Gratification—A
Louisiana-Scotland Creation, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN
LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND 208 (Vernon Palmer & Elspeth Reid eds., 2009); Melissa T.
Lonegrass, Convergence in Contort: Landlord Liability for Defective Premises in
Comparative Perspective, 85 TUL. L. REV. 413, 453-55 (2010).
148. Weiland v. King, 281 So. 2d 688, 690 (La. 1973).
149. Id.
150. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE CIVIL LAW OF LEASE IN LOUISIANA § 3-17
(1997). Courts occasionally applied the lessor’s contractual warranty to the tenant’s spouse or
children, in apparent recognition of the potential for unjust results. See, e.g., Crawford v.
Magnolia, 4 So. 2d 48, 50 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1941).
151. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2698 (2005).
152. This hypothetical is adapted from the facts of Wells v. Norris, 46,458 (La. App. 2
Cir. 8/10/11); 71 So. 3d 1165.
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lessor is answerable in contract.153 The strict nature of the warranty
against vices and defects imposes responsibility on the lessor even if
he was unaware of the danger.154 The lessee is entitled to damages for
his injuries and other losses,155 as are his family members.156 They have
ten years in which to sue.157 The lessor’s liability is not the same with
respect to the family friend, however. Her rights arise from the law of
delict rather than the contract that exists between the lessor and the
lessee.158 Thus, her claim lies in negligence and requires that she show
the lessor’s lack of reasonable care.159 Additionally, the family friend
must sue within one year or risk forfeiting her claim.160

B.

Contractual Alterations of the Lessor’s Obligations

The responsibilities of a lessor to lessees and third parties, while
significant, are not entirely immutable. Indeed, Louisiana courts have
long held that the lessor may be contractually relieved of his
obligations both to his tenant and third parties to the lease.161 However,
core principles of contractual privity implicit within the Code and
acknowledged by the Louisiana Supreme Court work to prevent a
lessor who has contractually shifted responsibility for the condition of
the leased premises to his tenant from avoiding tort responsibility to
third persons who are not parties to the contract.162 The inability of
landlords to protect themselves from tort liability arising from defects
in premises over which they had no control prompted legislative
intervention. In 1932, the Louisiana legislature enacted R.S. 9:3221, a
statute designed to permit landlords to partially shift the tort liability
owed to third parties to the tenant through a contractual assumption
clause.163 Although this narrow exception to the limits of contractual
privity initially sought to protect Louisiana landlords and encourage
the letting of residential and commercial space at affordable prices, in
153. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2696 (2013).
154. See id. art. 2697.
155. See supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
156. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2698.
157. See id. art. 3499; see also discussion supra note 143 (discussing jurisprudence
addressing the prescriptive period applicable to suits for personal injury resulting from breach
of the lessor’s obligations). Although not necessary for their recovery, the family may choose
also to plead the lessor’s liability in tort. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
158. See Weiland v. King, 281 So. 2d 688, 690 (La. 1973).
159. See id.
160. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492.
161. See infra notes 164-174 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
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the end it dramatically altered the rights and obligations of both parties
to the lease.
1.

Early Jurisprudence

The freedom of parties to contractually alter the lessor’s
obligations with respect to the condition of the premises has long been
recognized by the Louisiana jurisprudence. This freedom was first
addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in its 1901 decision in
Pierce v. Hedden, where it was held, with reference to French
jurisprudence, that “[t]he parties to a lease have the right . . . to
broaden or restrict their respective rights and obligations as to warranty
by a clause in their contract.”164 Later appellate decisions concurred in
this holding.165 For example, in the 1927 case of Pecararo v. Grover, a
lessee sued her landlord after part of the plaster ceiling in her rented
home fell and injured her.166 The lease contained a stipulation that
stated, “The lessor will not be responsible for damages caused . . . by
any vice or defects of the leased property.”167 In upholding the waiver,
the court relied on article 11 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
authorizing individuals to “renounce what the law has established in
their favor when the renunciation does not affect the rights of others,
and is not contrary to the public good.”168 According to the court,
because the provision in question affected the lessee alone and did not
violate public policy, it was valid.169 In deciding the issue of public
policy, the court cited French doctrine and jurisprudence concluding
that, under French law, then in effect, the warranty against vices and
defects could be freely renounced.170
The court also addressed early on the possibility that a lessor’s
delictual responsibilities could be altered by contract. In the 1919 case
of Clay v. Parsons, the wife of a residential tenant was injured when a
portion of her porch collapsed.171 When she sued her landlord for
164. 29 So. 734, 738 (La. 1901) (citing CODE CIV. [C. CIV.] art. 1721). The court
ultimately found, however, that although the parties to the lease had excluded the warranty
against vices and defects, they had not contemplated that the defects would be severe enough
to justify complete demolition of the building, and thus held that the clause did not relieve the
lessor of his obligation to the lessee. Id.
165. See, e.g., Pecararo v. Grover, 5 La. App. 676 (La. App. Orleans 1927); Cordona v.
Glenny, Orleans App. 22 (La. App. 1903).
166. 5 La. App. at 676.
167. Id. at 676-77.
168. Id. at 677 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 11 (1870)).
169. Id. at 677-78.
170. Id. at 677.
171. 81 So. 597, 597 (La. 1919).
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damages, the court rejected her claim, holding that she had expressly
assumed the risk of harm.172 Although the plaintiff was technically a
third party to the written lease, she had verbally agreed to an
understanding that the lessor—her husband—would not be responsible
for any repairs to the premises.173 Concluding that the plaintiff’s tort
claim was therefore barred, the court stated:
Our opinion is that the provisions of the Civil Code that hold the owner
of a building answerable for any injury that may befall another because
of the landlord’s neglect to make repairs are subject to the general law
of negligence, and that the obligation thus imposed by law upon the
landlord may be dispensed with, not only by a lessee as a condition of
his contract of lease, but by any one desiring to occupy the house and
174
willing to assume the risk.

Thus, the court concluded that any person—whether a lessee or a third
party to the lease—could expressly assume the risk of harm resulting
from a defect in the premises and thereby absolve the lessor from
delictual responsibility.
Following Clay v. Parsons, it seemed clear that the lessor could
potentially be relieved contractually of all liability for the condition of
the premises. Soon, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court articulated
an important limitation on contractual waivers of a lessor’s obligations.
In Klein v. Young (In re Klein), the court held that a lease agreement
allocating responsibility for the condition of the premises to the tenant
could not absolve the landlord from injuries suffered by a third person
who was not a party to the lease and who had not assumed the risk of
danger.175 The case involved a nurse who worked for and resided in the
home of a residential tenant and who was injured by the collapse of a
staircase in the building.176 When the plaintiff sued in tort, the lessor
defended the case on the ground that the tenant had contractually
assumed all responsibility for the safety of the building in the lease.177
The court rejected the defense, holding that “the lessee cannot, by
assuming the obligation, absolve the owner of the building from his

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 111 So. 495, 496-97 (La. 1926). This limitation was articulated by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit about a decade earlier. See Hero v. Hankins, 247
F. 664, 666 (5th Cir. 1917).
176. Klein, 111 So. at 496.
177. Id.
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responsibility to third persons who may be injured in consequence of
the owner’s neglect of a duty imposed by law in their favor.”178
Though conceptually sound, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
ruling in Klein produced a harsh result for landlords. While an owner’s
liability to his tenant could be avoided by the tenant’s assumption of
responsibility for the condition of the premises, the owner’s liability to
third parties remained unaffected by such a stipulation, even though
the lessor had no obligation vis-à-vis the tenant to maintain the
premises in a safe condition. This result was even more unfair when
the complaining party was the spouse or child of the lessee, entitled to
sue the lessor in tort despite a clause in the lease absolving the lessor
of the obligation to maintain the premises. Furthermore, at the time of
the court’s ruling in Klein, Louisiana Civil Code article 2322 imposed
strict liability on the owner of a building for damage caused by a vice
or defect in the property.179 Thus, a lessor-owner could be held strictly
liable for damage of which he was entirely unaware and unlikely to
discover due to the specifics of the lease. And, although the lessor in
such a case could sue the lessee for indemnity under the lease
agreement,180 he would still be subjected to the cost and inconvenience
of litigation with no guarantee of recovery against his tenant.
2.

Legislative Intervention

The result in Klein prompted the Louisiana legislature to
intervene. In 1932, the legislature enacted a statute designed to
overrule Klein and lessen the potential liability of a lessor-owner to

178. Id. at 497.
179. See Barnes v. Beirne, 38 La. Ann. 280, 282 (1886) (holding that ignorance of
defect does not exempt owner of liability under article 2322).
180. See Terrenova v. Feldner, 28 So. 2d 287, 290-91 (La. App. Orleans 1946) (“The
Supreme Court did not declare in Klein v. Young that provisions in a lease, under which the
lessee assumed responsibility for the condition of the premises, were contrary to public policy
or that they were not enforceable as between the parties to the lease. The court merely held
that stipulations of this sort could not affect the right of a third person to recover damages
from an owner for nonperformance of the legal duties required of him by Articles 670 and
2322 of the Code. The opinion does not say, nor do we think that it was ever contemplated by
the court, that an owner, condemned to pay damages to a third person as a result of the
lessee’s breach of a provision in the lease whereby the latter assumed responsibility for vices
and defects in the property, could not maintain an action against the lessee for the damages he
sustained by the breach or that the lessor, who was compelled to defend a suit brought by a
third person sustaining injuries by reason of the lessee’s breach of covenant, could not call the
lessee in warranty.”).
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third parties to the lease.181 In effect, the statute served to shield lessors
who shifted responsibility for the premises to their tenants from the
unforgiving standards of strict liability. Act No. 174 of 1932 (later
incorporated into the Revised Statutes as Title 9, Section 3221)
provided:
[T]he owners of buildings or premises which have been leased under a
contract whereby the tenant or occupant assumes responsibility for the
condition of the premises shall not be liable in damages for injury
caused by any vice or defect therein to any tenant or occupant, nor to
anyone in the building or on the premises by license of the tenant or
occupant, unless the owner knew of such vice or defect, or should
within reason have known thereof, or had received notice of such vice
or defect and failed to remedy same within a reasonable time
182
thereafter.

The new legislation thus permitted what Klein did not by absolving the
lessor from liability “to anyone in the building or on the premises”
when the lessee assumed responsibility for the premises.183 By
allowing lessors to shift contractually to the tenant a portion of their
delictual liability, the new statute served to encourage lessors to grant
residential and commercial leases, thus fostering housing and
commercial needs of the state by ensuring the affordability of leased
space.184 The statute also served to bring the lessor’s liability closer
into line with the common law, which at the time granted landlords
virtual immunity from liability for the condition of leased premises.185
The legislature’s deference to lessor-owners was not absolute,
however—by enforcing waivers except where the lessor “knew or
should have known of the defect or had received notice thereof and
failed to remedy it within a reasonable time,” the statute made clear
that the lessee could not assume responsibility toward third parties for
the lessor’s negligence.186

181. See Richard D. Moreno, Lease Law, 55 LA. L. REV. 555, 569 (1995); P. Ryan
Plummer, Comment, Personal Injury and the Louisiana Law of Lease, 64 LA. L. REV. 177,
180 (2003).
182. 1932 La. Acts 552.
183. Id.
184. See sources cited supra note 181.
185. Morris, supra note 134, at 406, 414; see also Lonegrass, supra note 147, at 41931 (tracing the evolution of English and American landlord-tenant law with respect to the
liability of landlords for defective conditions).
186. 1932 La. Acts 552.
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A Series of Anomalous Interactions

Since R.S. 9:3221 was first enacted, its interpretation and
application by courts, and even its treatment by the Law Institute and
legislature, have at all times reflected a poor understanding of the
statute’s original legislative purpose and the proper relationship
between statutory law and principles of a civil code. The story of the
misapplication and ill-advised amendment of R.S. 9:3221 is told here
in a series of four episodes, each of which illustrates how this single
piece of narrowly targeted statutory law has been allowed to shape the
contours of the lessor-lessee relationship at the expense of core Code
provisions.
1.

Episode 1: Undue Restriction of Contractual Freedom

Although R.S. 9:3221 was broadly worded to refer to the lessor’s
ability to shield himself from liability for damage caused “to any
tenant or occupant” of the property as well as “anyone in the building
or on the premises by license of the tenant or occupant,” the prevailing
academic view at the time of its adoption was that the statute changed
only the law affecting third parties to the lease, and not the law
governing the rights of lessees.187 Commentators discussing the statute
surmised that the impetus behind R.S. 9:3221 was to overrule Klein
and to thereby increase protections for lessors beyond what the law
previously allowed.188 This construction of the statute is sensible when
viewed in light of preexisting law. Because the law already permitted
the lessor to contract away his liability to his tenant, application of a
statute imposing liability for negligence despite the existence of a
waiver to disputes between the landlord and tenant would decrease,
rather than increase, landlord protection, contrary to the statute’s
supposed purpose.
The case law in the years following the statute’s enactment also
reflected a view that the statute applied to the claims of third parties
and not to those of lessees.189 And, although several courts cited R.S.
187. Id.; see ARMSTRONG, supra note 127, § 8.72; Philip deV. Claverie et al.,
Comment, The Louisiana Law of Lease, 39 TUL. L. REV. 798, 846-47, 849 (1965); Miller,
supra note 140, at 87-89.
188. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 127, § 8.72; Claverie et al., supra note 187, at 84647, 849; Miller, supra note 140, at 87-89; see also Vernon V. Palmer, The Residential Lease in
the Civil Law, 4 TUL. CIV. L.F. 3, 20 (1988) (describing R.S. 9:3221 as “a 1932 statute that
gave owner-lessors a certain degree of protection from strict liability tort claims by third
persons injured on the premises”).
189. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 124 So. 2d 913, 916 (La. 1960)
(“Act 174 of 1932, which was passed subsequent to the decision in the Klein case, was
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9:3221 when discussing the effect of assumption of liability clauses on
claims of lessees,190 in no case was the statute applied to limit the
enforceability of a contractual waiver and permit a lessee to recover
despite his assumption of responsibility for the condition of the
premises.
This view of R.S. 9:3221 remained in place for nearly half a
century, until the Louisiana Supreme Court abruptly reversed course in
1981. In Tassin v. Slidell Mini-Storage, Inc., the court explicitly found
a clause limiting the lessor’s contractual warranty against vices and
defects invalid under R.S. 9:3221.191 Tassin involved the claims of
lessees of storage space units who brought suit against their lessor,
seeking compensation for water damage to their personal property

undoubtedly designed to relieve the owner of some of the burdens imposed on him by law in
cases where he has given dominion or control of his premises to a tenant under a lease, for the
Act permits the owner to transfer his legal liability by contract to his lessee insofar as it may
pertain to injuries received by third persons who come on the property by license or invitation
of the lessee.”); Terrenova v. Feldner, 28 So. 2d 287, 289 (La. App. Orleans 1946) (“Having
become aware of the hardships imposed upon the owners of buildings by Articles 670 and
2322 of the Code under the broad interpretation given to those articles by our courts
(particularly where the buildings were occupied by tenants under a lease contract), the
Legislature of 1932 sought to provide an outlet for relief by the passage of Act No. 174.”).
190. See, e.g., Clofort v. Matmoor, Inc., 370 So. 2d 1305, 1307 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1979)
(finding that R.S. 9:3221 did not bar liability of lessor under articles 670, 2322, and 2695,
where an assumption of liability clause appeared only on rent receipts and not in the written
lease); ADD Chem. Co. v. Gulf-Marine Fabricators, Inc., 345 So. 2d 216, 220 (La. App. 3 Cir.
1977) (holding that the lessee was not entitled to damages caused by defect in leased storage
tanks where lessee assumed responsibility for condition of premises under R.S. 9:3221 and
lessor did not know nor should have known of existence of defect); Nelson v. Parkhurst, 304
So. 2d 72, 73 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1974) (finding that R.S. 9:3221 did not exonerate the lessor
from personal injuries suffered by the lessee where a provision in the lease imposed upon the
lessee the mere obligation to “keep ‘the premises in a reasonably good condition,’ and to
return it ‘in the same condition’” and did not clearly impose the responsibility for the
condition of the premises on the lessee); Standard Office Supply Co. v. Stonewall Inv. Co.,
267 So. 2d 768, 770 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1972) (holding that R.S. 9:3221 does not apply to
damages resulting from a defect that is not part of the leased premises and over which the
lessee has no supervision or control); Darnell v. Taylor, 236 So. 2d 57, 62 (La. App. 3 Cir.
1970) (finding that R.S. 9:3221 barred the sublessor’s claim against the lessor for damages
owed to the sublessee resulting from a defect in the premises); Meyers v. Drewes, 196 So. 2d
607, 611 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1967) (holding that under R.S. 9:3221, a contractual provision
barred the lessee’s demand for damages resulting from a defect in the premises); Abbott &
Barnes Credit Clothiers, Inc. v. Crane Clothing Co., 141 So. 2d 916, 919 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1962) (holding that the defendant could not “claim immunity” under R.S. 9:3221 because the
defect occurred outside of the leased premises and was therefore outside the scope of the
contractual assumption of responsibility); Hoffman v. Zimmer, 175 So. 115 (La. App. Orleans
1937) (noting that R.S. 9:3221 would apply to the injured tenant’s claim if the assumption of
liability could be proven, but ultimately finding that the evidence was insufficient to establish
the existence of contractual waiver).
191. 396 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (La. 1981).
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caused by a defect in the storage unit doors.192 The lessor defended the
actions by relying on provisions in the leases absolving the lessor from
any liability resulting from water damage.193 The trial court found in
favor of the lessees, relying on R.S. 9:3221 and reasoning that despite
the provision in the leases, the lessor knew or should have known that
the doors would not withstand the heavy rains and thunderstorms
common in southeast Louisiana.194 The Louisiana Court of Appeal for
the First Circuit reversed, finding no evidence that the lessor knew or
should have known that the doors would allow water seepage.195 The
appellate court also suggested, albeit indirectly, that R.S. 9:3221 may
have no application to claims between lessors and lessees, who were at
that time generally free under the Civil Code to waive the lessor’s
responsibility for the premises.196
The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeal
on both counts. Although the court recognized that “the usual
warranties and obligations imposed under the codal articles and
statutes dealing with lease may be waived,” the court applied R.S.
9:3221 to invalidate the waiver in the lease.197 According to the court,
it should have been obvious to the lessor that the doors, which did not
close flush with the concrete flooring of the storage units, would
permit the flow of water and cause damage to the lessees’ property.198
It is not immediately apparent that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
application of R.S. 9:3221 to waivers of the lessor’s contractual
warranty against vices and defects was in any way improper.199

192. Id. at 1262.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Tassin v. Slidell Mini-Storage, Inc., 388 So. 2d 67, 68-69 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1980),
rev’d, 396 So. 2d 1261.
196. See id. at 68 (quoting General Leasing Co. v. Leda Towing Co., 286 So. 2d 802
(La. App. 4 Cir. 1974) (“[S]tatutes dealing with obligations and rights of lessors . . . are not
prohibitory laws which would be unalterable by contractual agreement but are simply
intended to regulate the relationship between lessor and lessee when there is no contractual
stipulation imposed in the lease.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). At the time of the
Tassin decision, warranty waivers were not yet limited by either Louisiana Civil Code article
2004, which was enacted in 1985, or article 2699, which was enacted in 2005. See infra
notes 221-227 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions imposed by article 2004); see
also infra notes 274, 288-289, 299-304, 307-314 and accompanying text (discussing
restrictions imposed by article 2699).
197. Tassin, 396 So. 2d at 1264.
198. Id.
199. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that the Tassin decision was rendered in a
plurality opinion. The majority opinion authored by Justice Marcus was concurred in, rather
than joined, by Chief Justice Dixon and Justices Calogero, Dennis, Watson, Lemmon, and
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Although the Tassin court did not engage in a textual analysis of R.S.
9:3221, its use of the statute to limit the effect of a waiver of the
lessor’s warranty is certainly supported by a literal reading of the
legislation. Indeed, R.S. 9:3221 insulates the lessor from liability “to
the lessee or anyone on the premises who derives his right to be
thereon from the lessee” unless the notice provisions of the statute are
met.200 Thus by its terms, the statute regulates the enforceability of a
waiver of liability when the lessee complains of damage resulting from
a defect in the premises.
However, the plain language of the legislation clearly derogates
from the general principles of the Civil Code, as articulated by the
court in Klein, regarding the contractual freedom afforded to a
tenant.201 Whereas Klein recognized a tenant’s power to waive the
lessor’s obligations, Tassin interpreted R.S. 9:3221 to impose
responsibility on a lessor for known defects in spite of the lessee’s clear
waiver.202 Moreover, Tassin’s application of R.S. 9:3221 to a breach of
warranty claim between landlord and tenant produces a result directly
contrary to the purpose of the legislation, which was to permit lessors
to insulate themselves from liability in a manner previously
unrecognized by Louisiana law.203 Prior to the statute’s enactment in
1932, Louisiana courts freely allowed the lessee’s assumption of
responsibility for the condition of the premises to absolve the lessor
from any liability to the lessee for injuries caused by defects in the
premises.204 Although no specific statutory provision expressly
authorized contractual waivers of the lessor’s warranty, Louisiana
courts upheld such provisions as consistent with general principles of
the Civil Code as well as French jurisprudence and doctrine addressing
the validity of contractual waivers in France.205 Thus, when R.S.
9:3221 was enacted, it was already the law that a lessee who assumed
responsibility for the condition of the premises was contractually
barred from recovering from the lessor for his injuries.206 Not
permitted were attempts by a lessor to shift his responsibility entirely
Blanche. None of the concurring Justices authored a separate opinion explaining why he
concurred in the result but not in the reasoning of the majority.
200. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3221 (1950) (emphasis added).
201. Klein v. Young, 111 So. 495, 497-99 (La. 1926).
202. Tassin, 396 So. 2d at 1264; Klein, 111 So. at 497.
203. Compare Tassin, 396 So. 2d at 1264 (holding landlord liable despite waiver), with
1932 La. Acts 552 (explaining that the purpose of R.S. 9:3221 was to insulate lessors from
liability, as applied to expanding liability).
204. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
205. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
206. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
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to third parties to his lessee by way of an assumption clause.207 Hence,
R.S. 9:3221 was enacted not to permit contractual waivers of the
lessor’s obligations to his lessee, but to extend the effect of a stipulation
in the lease to third parties and to provide greater protection to the
lessor than was possible under Klein. When the statute is applied to
disputes between lessor and lessee, however, the result is that the lessor
receives less protection than was previously allowed by Louisiana
courts.
Not only does the application of R.S. 9:3221 to the rights of
lessees appear to contradict the legislative intent, it produces irrational
effects in that it renders contractual waivers of the lessor’s warranty
practically meaningless. Even if the lessee assumes responsibility for
the condition of the premises, according to the statute the
responsibility for damages resulting from defects is transferred back to
the lessor by either actual or constructive knowledge.208 Thus, a lessee
who is contractually obligated to maintain the premises is all but
relieved of this obligation merely by notifying the lessor of the
existence of the defect.209 Presumably, the lessee’s assumption of
liability encourages the lessor to let the space for a reduced rent, but
the notice provisions that result in the invalidation of an assumption
clause effectively render the landlord the insurer of the lessee. As a
result, lessees who assume responsibility for the condition of the
premises may be better off than those who do not, at least in terms of
the rental cost.210
Additionally, Tassin’s holding that R.S. 9:3221 limits the
enforceability of waivers of the lessor’s contractual warranty produced
a strange rift in the law governing leases of immovables versus leases
of movables. By its terms, R.S. 9:3221 applies only to leases of
“premises” and does not affect the validity of waivers of the lessor’s
207. Klein, 111 So. at 497.
208. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3221 (2013).
209. Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bass, 486 So. 2d 789, 796 (La. App. 1 Cir.
1986) (Carter, J., dissenting). R.S. 9:3221 addresses only the lessor’s liability for “damages”
resulting from defects in the premises, and does not specifically address the duty to make
repairs. See Hebert v. Neyrey, 445 So. 2d 1165, 1168 n.3 (La. 1984) (“There is a distinction
between liability for damages occasioned by defects in the premises and who has the
obligation to repair such defects.”). However, as a practical matter, because R.S. 9:3221
imposes liability for damages on landlords who fail to make repairs in a timely manner, the
statute acts to shift responsibility for taking steps to make repairs to the landlord once he is
notified of the defect. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 304 and
accompanying text.
210. Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and
Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457, 531-32 (1994).
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warranty in leases of movable things.211 Indeed, just several years prior
to Tassin, the Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed, in a case involving
a lease of equipment, the basic principle that the lessor’s warranty
against vices and defects is freely waivable.212 In so doing, the court
relied on provisions of the Civil Code underscoring the sanctity of
contractual freedom213 and the power of parties to a contract to alter or
renounce implied warranties.214 Following Tassin, two distinct bodies
of jurisprudence developed surrounding the enforceability of warranty
waivers affecting movable things on the one hand,215 and immovable
things on the other.216 Worse still, Louisiana courts have offered
absolutely no basis for this distinction other than the mere existence of
the special legislation relating to “premises” only.217
Because the Tassin opinion contains minimal analysis, it is
difficult to know precisely what motivated the court’s decision. It may
be that the court favored an interpretation of the statute that would
ameliorate the harsh effects of what was very likely a contract of
adhesion.218 On the other hand, perhaps a more thorough parsing of the
211. La. REV. STAT. § 9:3221.
212. La. Nat’l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92, 95 (La. 1979). But see
Andrus v. Cajun Insulation Co., 524 So. 2d 1239 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1988) (holding that the
lessor’s waiver of warranties was against public policy and invalid).
213. La. Nat’l Leasing Corp., 377 So. 2d at 95 (“Individuals cannot, by their
conventions, derogate from the force of laws made for the preservation of public good or
good morals; however, in all cases in which it is not expressly or impliedly prohibited, they
can renounce what the law has established in their favor, when the renunciation does not
affect the rights of others, and is not contrary to the public good.” (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art.
11 (1870))).
214. Id. at 94 (“All things that are not forbidden by law, may legally become the
subject of, or the motive for contracts; but different agreements are governed by different
rules, adapted to the nature of each contract, to distinguish which it is necessary in every
contract to consider: . . . (2) Things which, although not essential to the contract, yet are
implied from the nature of such agreement, if no stipulation be made respecting them, but
which the parties may expressly modify or renounce, without destroying the contract or
changing its description; of this nature is warranty, which is implied in every sale, but which
may be modified or renounced, without changing the character of the contract or destroying
its effect.” (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764 (1870))).
215. See Walnut Equip. Leasing Co. v. Moreno, 26,004 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/94); 643
So. 2d 327; First Cont’l Leasing Corp. v. Howard, 618 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1993).
216. See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Ford v. Bienvenu, 2000-2376, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/29/01); 804 So. 2d
64, 69.
218. A contract of adhesion is a standard form contract, often preprinted, prepared by a
party in a position of superior bargaining power and offered to the other party on a take-it-orleave-it basis. Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 2004-2804, 2004-2857, pp. 9-10 (La.
6/29/05); 908 So. 2d 1, 8-9; Saúl Litvinoff, Consent Revisited: Offer Acceptance Option

Right of First Refusal and Contracts of Adhesion in the Revision of the Louisiana Law of
Obligations, 47 LA. L. REV. 699, 757-59 (1987).
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statute’s legislative history and its relationship to Civil Code principles
governing contractual freedom would have produced a different result.
In any event, after Tassin, Louisiana courts have consistently applied
R.S. 9:3221 to regulate not only the lessor’s liability to third parties to
the lease, but also contractual waivers of the lessor’s warranty against
vices and defects.219 Indeed, with very few exceptions, every
subsequent reported decision involving a contractual waiver of the
lessor’s warranty against vices and defects in a lease of premises has
raised R.S. 9:3221 in some fashion.220 Yet, as will be shown below, this
transmutation of the statute was merely the first step in the severance
of R.S. 9:3221 from the Civil Code’s elemental policies governing
freedom of contract.
2.

Episode 2: A Poor Fit with Public Policy

Episode 2 begins with comprehensive revision of the Civil Code
title on Conventional Obligations in 1985. In that revision, a new
article was added which, for the first time, directly addressed public
policy limitations on exculpatory contracts—agreements by which an
obligee relieves an obligor of some or all responsibility for failure to
perform an obligation. Article 2004 provides in full:
Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the liability of
one party for intentional or gross fault that causes damage to the other
party.

219. See, e.g., Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Robertson, 713 F.2d 1151, 1160 (5th Cir.
1983); Brown v. Floyd, 2007-0478, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/30/08); 2008 WL 241278 at *23; Owens v. Entergy Corp., 2007-616, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/21/07); 970 So. 2d 1212, 1215;
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Veninata, 2006-1641, 2006-1642, pp. 3-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/7/07); 971
So. 2d 420, 423-24; Thompson v. BGK Equities, Inc., 2004-2366, p. 5 n.3 (La. App. 1 Cir.
11/4/05); 927 So. 2d 351, 354 n.3; Barnes v. Riverwood Apartments P’ship, 38,331, pp. 9-10
(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/7/04); 870 So. 2d 490, 496-97; Hampton v. Succession of Malter, 20011149, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/9/02); 806 So. 2d 900, 903; Ford, 2000-2376 at p. 9; 804 So.
2d at 70; GEO Consultants Int’l v. Prof’l Roofing & Constr., Inc., 95-1016, pp. 4-6 (La. App.
5 Cir. 3/26/96); 672 So. 2d 1002, 1005-06; Ganheart v. Exec. House Apartments, 95-1278, p.
8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/15/96); 671 So. 2d 525, 530; Robert v. Espinosa, 576 So. 2d 555, 556-57
(La. App. 4 Cir. 1991); Ostrander v. Parkland Villa Apartments, 511 So. 2d 1293, 1294-95
(La. App. 2 Cir. 1987); Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bass, 486 So. 2d 789, 792-93
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1986); Matt v. Cox, 478 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1985); Pylate v.
Inabnet, 458 So. 2d 1378, 1386 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1984); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
French Eighth, 457 So. 2d 35, 36-37 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1984); Savoy v. DeLaup, 442 So. 2d
1209, 1211 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1983); Walsh Filter Co. v. Rice, 439 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (La. App.
4 Cir. 1983).
220. See cases cited supra note 219.
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Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the liability of
221
one party for causing physical injury to the other party.

In order for an exculpatory contract to comply with the first paragraph
of article 2004, it must not insulate the obligor from “intentional or
gross fault.”222 This prohibition derives from the principle that
contracts must always be performed in good faith.223 The enforcement
of a clause shifting liability from obligor to obligee when the obligor
has acted in bad faith would violate this most basic precept.224 On the
other hand, by implication, exculpatory clauses that shield an obligor
from negligence in acting or failing to act are permissible. Ostensibly,
because merely negligent behavior does not involve bad faith, the
parties are free to contract for the eventuality that the obligor may
cause damage through his own carelessness.
Regardless of the obligor’s fault, under the second paragraph of
article 2004, an exculpatory contract may never exclude or limit the
obligor’s liability for physical injury suffered by the obligee.225 This
rule, which operates as a significant retrenchment on the power of the
parties to contract away an obligor’s negligence, derives from a
fundamental public policy that the physical integrity of human beings
is sacrosanct.226 By prohibiting exculpatory clauses from shielding
liability for personal injuries, the Code ensures that bodily harm and
concomitant emotional trauma do not go uncompensated.227
The potential conflicts between article 2004 and R.S. 9:3221 are
immediately apparent. First, the statute’s notice provisions invalidate
waivers of the lessor’s obligations when the lessor “knew or should
have known of the defect or had received notice thereof and failed to
remedy it within a reasonable time.”228 Thus, the statute invalidates an
exculpatory clause when the lessor is merely negligent in failing to
remedy a defect in a timely manner. In this way, R.S. 9:3221 is far
more restrictive than the Civil Code with respect to the enforceability
of exculpatory clauses, because it is clear that article 2004 permits
221. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (2013).
222. Id.
223. Id. art. 1983.
224. LITVINOFF, supra note 139, § 11.11.
225. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004.
226. LITVINOFF, supra note 139, § 11.14.
227. Professor Litvinoff has also argued along the same lines that moral damages,
even if unaccompanied by physical harm, should be protected against complete exculpation.
See Saul Litvinoff, Stipulations as to Liability and as to Damages, 52 TUL. L. REV. 258, 281
(1978).
228. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3221 (2013).
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waiver of liability resulting from mere negligence, except when that
negligence results in physical injury.229 Second, R.S. 9:3221 makes no
distinction between damages to the lessee’s person and other forms of
harm.230 Thus, to the extent that the statute absolves a lessor from
liability for physical injuries, the statute is far more permissive than
article 2004. The discord between the two provisions is a source of
consternation and confusion for landlords, tenants, and the lawyers
who represent them.
Despite the poor fit between code and statute, R.S. 9:3221 was
not altered when article 2004 was enacted. According to the official
legislative comments, article 2004, though new, did not change the
law.231 Furthermore, official comment (f) to article 2004 states that the
article “does not supersede R.S. 9:3221.”232 Though the comments do
not carry the force of legislation,233 they are at least indicative of the
mindset of the reporter primarily responsible for the revision of the
title on Conventional Obligations. On its face, comment (f) articulates
implicit approval of a rule permitting a lessor to insulate himself from
responsibility for physical harm suffered by his tenant in cases
involving his strict liability, though not in cases involving his
negligence.234
On the other hand, it is difficult to discern why leases of premises
should provide the sole exception to the policy-based prohibition on
exculpation of personal injury. Are tenants any less deserving of
protection than other victims of physical harm? If, as comment (f)
suggests, article 2004 and R.S. 9:3221 are to coexist reasonably, it is
necessary to return to the original purpose of the law. If R.S. 9:3221
applies only to tort claims brought by third parties to the lease, and not
to claims between lessor and lessee, then no conflict between code and
statute arises. As written, article 2004 contemplates solely two parties
and is concerned only with contracts by which one party exculpates
the other from liability for damage.235 Contracts by which two parties
allocate between themselves liability owed to a third person, such as
indemnity agreements, are not covered by the article, for these types of
agreements do not affect the right of the injured party to seek
229. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004.
230. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3221.
231. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 cmt. (a).
232. Id. art. 2004 cmt. (f).
233. 1984 La. Acts 910 (“The headings and comments in this Act are not part of the
law and are not enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion in this Act.”).
234. See LITVINOFF, supra note 139, § 11.14.
235. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004.
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compensation.236 While R.S. 9:3221, when applied to a third party,
impacts whom the injured party may sue, it does not necessarily
foreclose the right of action altogether, as an exculpatory agreement
between two parties would.237 However, Tassin’s application of R.S.
9:3221 to claims between lessor and lessee paved the way for conflict
between the statute and the Civil Code’s newly articulated boundaries
on contractual freedom.
Soon after article 2004 was enacted, the Louisiana Supreme
Court rendered a ruling that appeared to prevent R.S. 9:3221 from
shielding lessors from liability for personal injuries suffered by tenants.
In Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., the court considered the validity of
an exculpatory clause in a permit for the use of the Fair Grounds’ stall
facilities to stable horses.238 The permittee sued the Fair Grounds after
he fell from a loft in the stables that lacked handrails or bannisters, in
violation of applicable building codes.239 The court concluded that
because the permittee was physically injured, article 2004 rendered the
exculpatory provision in the permit agreement unenforceable.240
Because Ramirez technically involved a permit, as opposed to a lease,
the court did not consider R.S. 9:3221. However, the distinction
between the permit in Ramirez and a lease of premises is a thin one,
and Ramirez raises serious questions concerning the continued
enforceability of a clause in a lease that would absolve the lessor from
liability for physical injuries of the tenant.241
Following Ramirez, only two courts have directly addressed the
relationship between R.S. 9:3221 and article 2004, and both did so
unsatisfactorily. In Mendoza v. Seidenbach, the Louisiana Court of
Appeal for the Fourth Circuit applied R.S. 9:3221 to shield a landlord
from liability for personal injuries suffered by the tenant’s employee.242
Dismissing the plaintiff’s argument that Ramirez required the court to
find that a lease provision cannot exclude the lessor’s liability for
personal injuries, the court merely remarked, “Ramirez did not address
a ‘lease’ provision and is inapplicable to the present case.”243 The
Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit addressed the interplay
236. Id. art. 2004 cmt. (e).
237. See Weiland v. King, 281 So. 2d 688, 690 (La. 1973).
238. 575 So. 2d 811, 812 (La. 1991).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 813.
241. See Galligan, supra note 210, at 528; Maraist & Galligan, supra note 135, at 359
n.100; Plummer, supra note 181, at 190-92.
242. 598 So. 2d 404, 404 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992).
243. Id. at 406.
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between R.S. 9:3221 and article 2004 in Guillory v. Foster, a case also
involving a lessor’s liability to a tenant’s employee.244 There, the court
reasoned, “[I]f Article 2004 had been intended to negate La.R.S.
9:3221, the latter statute would have been repealed in the act which
enacted the former statute.”245 Both cases involved tort claims brought
by third parties who were not signatories to the lease contracts. Thus,
the courts could have reasoned that the limitations of the Civil Code
did not apply because article 2004 is designed to prevent a party who
is physically injured from contracting away his right of action in
advance of the harm and does not extend to agreements by which two
parties allocate between themselves responsibility to third persons.
Instead, however, both opinions broadly endorsed the continued
viability of R.S. 9:3221. Later appellate court decisions have
continued to assume that R.S. 9:3221 articulates an exception to the
limitations of article 2004, even when personal injuries suffered by
tenants are concerned.246 Though these cases have not directly
addressed the relationship between R.S. 9:3221 and article 2004, it is
clear that the courts do not regard the Civil Code as an obstacle to the
statute’s application to personal injury claims.
The discord between R.S. 9:3221 and the policies implicit
in article 2004 has also been raised in cases involving employees
complaining of defective conditions in the premises leased by their
employers. Here, Louisiana courts have applied R.S. 9:3221 to
preclude employees from recovering personal injury damages from
their employers’ lessors.247 Although the application of R.S.
9:3221 to bar the claims of third parties to a lease does not at first
blush appear at odds with article 2004, the particulars of Louisiana
workers’ compensation law complicate the interaction of these
rules in this context. According to the exclusive remedy provision
of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law, employers and
their agents cannot be held liable for workers’ injuries caused by
negligence.248 Applying this exclusivity provision, Louisiana
244. 634 So. 2d 1372, 1373 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1994).
245. Id. at 1374.
246. See, e.g., Simon v. Hillensbeck, 2012-0087, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/19/12); 100
So. 3d 946, 951; Wells v. Norris, 46,458, pp. 4-6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11); 71 So. 3d 1165,
1168-69; Shubert v. Tonti Dev. Corp., 09-348, p. 13 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/09); 30 So. 3d 977,
986; Stuckey v. Riverstone Residential SC, LP, 2008-1770, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/5/09);
21 So. 3d 970, 974-75; Greely v. OAG Props., LLC, 44,240, p. 9-10 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/13/09);
12 So. 3d 490, 495-96; Owens v. Entergy Corp., 2007-616, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/21/07);
970 So. 2d 1212, 1215.
247. See Mendoza, 598 So. 2d at 405-07.
248. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1032 (2013).
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courts have repeatedly found that employer-lessees who assume
the responsibility for the condition of leased premises are immune
from suit for damages resulting from defects in the property.249 The
combination of R.S. 9:3221 and the Workers’ Compensation Law
thus has denied the injured employees of any recourse in tort
whatsoever: the lessor is immune under R.S. 9:3221, and at the
same time, the employer is immune from tort claims under the
Workers’ Compensation Law. The enforcement of a contractual
provision that has the effect of entirely denying the claim of an
injured employee arguably violates the spirit of article 2004, which
is primarily concerned with ensuring that a physically injured party
retains the right to sue despite contractual language to the
contrary.250 Although some courts have relied on article 2004 to
deny immunity to a lessor under R.S. 9:3221 when the lessee was
also immune from tort claims under the Workers’ Compensation
Law, this approach has not been uniform.251
Furthermore, following the enactment of article 2004, no one—
neither courts nor commentators—questioned the continued wisdom
of applying R.S. 9:3221 to limit the contractual freedom of the parties
to a lease when physical injury is not at issue. Article 2004 prohibits
the enforcement of exculpatory clauses when the obligor is
intentionally or grossly at fault, but does not prohibit exculpation of an
obligor’s negligence unless physical injury results.252 Thus, under
article 2004, the parties to a lease could agree that the lessor will not
be liable for property damage or economic loss resulting from a defect
249. See Dufrene v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 01-47, p. 12 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/01); 790 So. 2d
660, 669; Douglas v. Hillhaven Rest Home, Inc., 97-0596, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/98); 709
So. 2d 1079, 1082; Hesse v. Champ Serv. Line, 97-1090, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/4/98); 707
So. 2d 1295, 1298; Dumestre v. Hansell-Petetin, Inc., 96-1778, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1/29/97); 688 So. 2d 187, 190. Note that a lessee-employer, though immune from suit by the
injured employee, may enter into a valid contract to indemnify the lessor-owner for damages
resulting from defects in the premises. See Byrne v. Sealy & Co., 99-288, p. 7 (La. App. 5
Cir. 8/31/99); 742 So. 2d 668, 671; 14 H. ALSTON JOHNSON, III, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 374 (5th ed. 2010).
250. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (2013); Ramirez v. Fair Grounds Corp., 575 So.
2d 811 (La. 1991). Of course, because the injured employee retains the right to recover under
the Workers’ Compensation Law, his right to recovery is not entirely foreclosed. See LA. REV.
STAT. § 23:1032.
251. Compare Wallace v. Helmer Directional Drilling, Inc., 93-901 (La. App. 3 Cir.
7/13/94); 641 So. 2d 624 (relying on article 2004 to deny immunity to lessor), with Dufrene,
01-47 at pp. 13-14; 790 So. 2d at 670 (holding that the tenant as defendant was afforded
immunity, without considering article 2004), and Plauche v. Bell, 98-2987, 99-0707, p. 6 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 5/3/00); 762 So. 2d 130, 134 (same), and Haley v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 99883, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/8/99); 753 So. 2d 882, 888 (same).
252. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004.
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in the leased premises, even if the lessor learned of the defect and did
not take steps to repair it. No explanation obviously comes to mind for
a rule that invalidates exculpatory clauses in cases where damage is
caused by the mere negligence of a lessor, when greater latitude is
afforded to obligors of other types. The restrictive tenor of R.S. 9:3221
may seem sensible when applied to third party tort claims against the
lessor, because the statute insulates the lessor from liability toward a
person who did not agree to such a limitation. But when the statute is
applied to a lessee’s claim in warranty, it quite visibly conflicts with
article 2004’s articulation of public policy limitations on contractual
waivers.
3.

Episode 3: Statutory Anachronism Following Tort Reform

The utility of contractual provisions allocating responsibility
between lessor and lessee for the condition of the premises was
dramatically altered in 1996. In that year, the Louisiana legislature
enacted sweeping tort reform, the effects of which included reducing
the standard of liability for landowners and those with custody of a
thing from strict liability to negligence.253 Under the new legislation, a
lessor is no longer held strictly liable in tort for damages resulting from
defects in the premises. This change in the underlying tort standard
obviated the purported need for R.S. 9:3221, which was to reduce the
lessor’s tort liability to a negligence standard when the lease contained
an assumption of liability clause.254 Today, the inclusion of an
assumption of liability clause in a lease does nothing to alter the
delictual standard of liability—the lessor is simply liable for his own
negligence, regardless of any agreement of the parties to the
contrary.255
Despite the fact that R.S. 9:3221 no longer serves the original
purpose for which it was enacted, the statute was not repealed in 1996.
As a result, it continued to constrain the freedom of parties to a lease to
waive the contractual warranty against vices and defects.256 However,
253. 1996 La. Acts 710; see also Maraist & Galligan, supra note 135, at 342-43, 35051, 368-69 (discussing the reduction of landowner’s liability in Act 1 of the first extraordinary
session of 1996).
254. See supra notes 180, 186-187 and accompanying text.
255. See Plummer, supra note 181, at 188-89.
256. See, e.g., FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, LOUISIANA TORT LAW
§ 9.12[5] (2004 ed. Supp. 2006) (“[S]trict liability, the only significant tort liability from
which 9:3221 protected the lessor, is no longer as serious a concern. However, it may still be
significant in cases where a lessor is still strictly liable under the Civil Code articles dealing
with lease.”); Maraist & Galligan, supra note 135, at 359 n.100 (“[Following the 1996 tort
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it is not entirely clear that the intent of the drafters in leaving the statute
untouched was to restrict the freedom of parties to a lease to alter the
lessor’s warranty obligations. A review of the limited scholarly
doctrine commenting upon the retention of R.S. 9:3221 reflects some
belief that the statute provides the sole authority for waivers of the
lessor’s warranty against vices and defects.257 The post-Tassin
jurisprudence reflects a similar view.258 Thus, by 1996 the prevailing
view among academics, judges, and likely legislators was an erroneous
one—that R.S. 9:3221, and not the Civil Code, contained the standards
of contractual freedom that would permit parties to a lease to alter the
lessor’s obligations.259 This error, it seems, led directly to the statute’s
preservation.
Of course, the suggestion that R.S. 9:3221 is the source of law
authorizing the lessee’s waiver of the lessor’s obligation is misguided.
Prior to the statute’s enactment, Louisiana courts had uniformly held
that the lessor’s contractual and delictual obligations to the lessee could
be freely altered by the parties.260 And indeed, even after R.S. 9:3221
was made law, Louisiana courts continued to hold that the parties to
leases of movables enjoyed complete contractual freedom to waive the

reforms,] section 9:3221 is of much less practical utility. If the lessor is not strictly liable for
building defects, why include the 9:3221 clause? The answer is that the lessor may have a
vestige of strict liability, at least to the lessor [sic], under Article 2695. Undoubtedly,
commercial lawyers representing lessors would be well advised to continue to include the
9:3221 clause in leases in which they draft.”).
257. See, e.g., Galligan, supra note 210, at 529 (“This statute allows a lessor to
contract away his strict liability under landlord-tenant law, as provided in Article 2695.”); see
also 12 WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, TORT LAW § 18.29 (2d ed.
2009) (“[T]he protection of R.S. 9:3221 may be said to be surplusage when responsibility of
the lessor is sought under Articles 660 and 2322 since liability under those articles after the
1996 Tort Reform is in negligence. C.C. art. 2695 was not so amended. The lessor’s
responsibility thereunder remains in strict liability and the protection of R.S. 9:3221 is still
meaningful under that article.”); id. § 18.30 (“The responsibility of the nonowner lessor
would be found only under C.C. art. 2695 as discussed above. The transfer of responsibility
to the lessee under R.S. 9:3221 would be very beneficial to the lessor under the
circumstances.”); 18 H. ALSTON JOHNSON, III, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 12.14 (2d ed. 2001) (“One of the defenses which the law permits the lessor
of defective premises to raise is that, by contract, the lessee has assumed responsibility for the
condition of the premises, thus relieving the lessor of that responsibility to the lessee or to
anyone on the premises who derives the right to be there from the lessee. The law permitting
this defense reads as follows . . . .” (emphasis added)).
258. For example, one Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit opinion
pronounces, “LSA-R.S. 9:3221 clearly gives authority for contractual modification of the
lessor’s warranty imposed by the Civil Code.” Matt v. Cox, 478 So. 2d 918, 919 (La. App. 1
Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
259. See supra notes 257-258 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 164-174 and accompanying text.
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lessor’s warranty against vices and defects.261 These decisions were
predicated on core principles of the Civil Code regarding contractual
freedom. Article 11, appearing in the Preliminary title of the 1870
Code, provided:
Individuals cannot by their conventions, derogate from the force of laws
made for the preservation of public order or good morals. But in all
cases in which it is not expressly or impliedly prohibited, they can
renounce what the law has established in their favor, when the
renunciation does not affect the rights of others, and is not contrary to
262
the public good.

Article 1764 of the Code of 1870 further stated that implied warranties
are not essential elements of contracts, but instead can be “modified or
renounced.”263 Ideally, had R.S. 9:3221 been repealed in 1996,
contractual agreements between lessor and lessee would again be
regulated by those general principles of the law, together with the
newly articulated limitations of article 2004.264
Additionally, and most certainly contrary to the expectations of
the legislature, R.S. 9:3221 has persisted in courts’ analyses of tort
261. See supra notes 211-217 and accompanying text.
262. LA. CIV. CODE art. 11 (1870).
263. Id. art. 1764.
264. Because both article 11 and article 1764 were suppressed in the respective
revisions of the Preliminary Title and the title on Obligations in General, it may be the case
that the redactors retained R.S. 9:3221 out of concern that its repeal would signal to courts
that clauses purporting to alter the lessor’s obligation to maintain in the premises were no
longer legislatively authorized. Although it cannot be seriously maintained that the revision
in any way changed the tenor of the law, it may be maintained that the redactors’ suppression
of articles 11 and 7 did some damage to the fabric of the Code by making those principles
relating to contractual freedom implicit rather than explicit. When the Preliminary Title was
revised in 1987, for example, article 7 was amended to state: “Persons may not by their
juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. Any act in
derogation of such laws is an absolute nullity.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 7 (1987). New article
7 does not reproduce the second paragraph of old article 11, upon which the early
jurisprudence upholding waivers of the lessor’s obligations were based. Comment (a) to new
article 7 states that article 7 “is based on Articles 11 and 12 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870” and “does not change the law.” Id. art. 7 cmt. (a).
The comments further explain:
The second paragraph of Article 11 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 contains a
self-evident proposition, that a private person may renounce a right or privilege
unless renunciation is expressly or impliedly forbidden, affects the rights of others,
or is contrary to public good. For this reason, that paragraph has not been
reproduced in this revision.
Id. art. 7 cmt. (c).
It should be noted that article 11 was never explicitly repealed but instead was
“amended and reenacted.” See 1987 La. Acts 404. Professor Vernon Palmer has argued that
provisions of the Code of 1870 that are not explicitly repealed are still in force and effect.
See Palmer, Death of a Code, supra note 6, at 230.
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claims brought against lessors. Indeed, many cases examining the tort
liability of a lessor whose lease contains a clause shifting responsibility
for the condition of the premises to the lessee rely on R.S. 9:3221 to
evaluate the effect of that clause.265 Facially this appears appropriate—
when the lessor defends the claim by relying upon the language of the
contract, the court turns to the statute addressing the enforceability of a
provision that would exculpate the lessor. However, not a single court
has commented upon the fact that since the change in the underlying
tort standard brought about by the 1996 tort reforms, an attempt by the
lessor to shift tort liability to his lessee has absolutely no effect. While
the statute provides that such a provision is effective unless the lessor is
negligent in failing to remedy a known defect, tort liability does not

265. See, e.g., Price v. Roadhouse Grill, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 511, 520-21 (W.D. La.
2007) (“[E]ven if the car stop constituted a defect, Section 3221 and the provisions of the
ground lease absolve [defendant] of liability unless [defendant] knew or should have known
of the defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable
time.”); Pourciau v. ECCO Nino, Inc., 2011-2031, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/23/12); 2012 WL
3631123, at *4 (“Additionally, La. R.S. 9:3221 requires that plaintiffs demonstrate that Equity
One had knowledge of a defect in its premises or should have known that its lessees failed to
act reasonably to prevent a defect.”); Jamison v. D’Amico, 2006-0842, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir.
3/14/07); 955 So. 2d 161, 166 (“La. Rev. Stat. 9:3221 was appropriately applied in the instant
case.”); Altvater v. Labranche Props., Inc., 2004-1484, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05); 901
So. 2d 584, 586-87 (holding that lessor had shifted responsibility for condition of premises to
lessee under terms of lease and did not have any kind of notice of alleged design defect in
premises that would establish liability under R.S. 9:3221); Smith v. French Mkt. Corp., 20031412, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/6/04); 886 So. 2d 527, 531 (holding that plaintiff did not
establish that lessor knew or should have known of alleged defect as required to establish
liability under R.S. 9:3221); Pamplin v. Bossier Parish Cmty. Coll., 38,533, p. 7 n.2 (La. App.
2 Cir. 7/14/04); 878 So. 2d 889, 894 n.2 (“Even in those contexts where the lessor has
contractually placed responsibility on the lessee and has no garde of the premises, La. R.S.
9:3221 nevertheless recognizes liability on the lessor who ‘knew or should have known of the
defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable time.’”);
Raines v. Colley, 2003-1630, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/7/04); 872 So. 2d 537, 540 (“[W]e find
that the indemnity/hold harmless clause transferred responsibility for the condition of the
[premises] from . . . lessor to . . . lessee.”); Cochran v. Safeguard Self-Storage, Inc., 02-1272,
02-1273, 02-1274, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/29/03); 845 So. 2d 1128, 1132 (holding that
R.S. 9:3221 did not apply to plaintiff’s claim because defect occurred in common area not
covered by assumption clause); Dufrene v. Doctor’s Hosp., Inc., 02-654, p. 8 (La. App. 5 Cir.
12/11/02); 836 So. 2d 309, 313 (“[T]o establish the liability of [the lessor], under La. R.S.
9:3221, Plaintiffs’ [sic] must prove that [the lessor] ‘knew or should have known of the defect
or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable time period.’”);
Marcades v. Cleanerama, Inc., 2002-0357, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/25/02); 831 So. 2d 288,
289 (analyzing liability of lessor under R.S. 9:3221); Jones v. Gatusso, 00-1654, p. 5 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 2/14/01); 782 So. 2d 11, 13 (“Defendants contend that by this provision of the
lease and in accordance with LSA-R.S. 9:3221, [lessor] contractually relinquished
responsibility for any alleged defects within the building. We agree.”); Ledet v. Doe, 00-112,
pp. 7-8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/17/00); 762 So. 2d 242, 245-46 (noting in dicta that lessor
transferred responsibility for condition of the premises to lessee).
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attach in the first instance unless the lessor is negligent.266 Thus, the
very set of facts that supports a lessor’s delictual liability simultaneously destroys the effectiveness of an attempted waiver. The
existence or nonexistence of the assumption of liability clause is
entirely irrelevant to the strength of the plaintiff’s claim.
Although the statute’s continued application to tort liability has
not drastically undermined the courts’ analyses of these claims, it has
muddied the jurisprudence. For example, some courts rely on R.S.
9:3221 to utilize a distinct “test” for liability when the lease contains
an assumption of liability clause, though in substance the inquiry is no
different from the negligence analyses under articles 2317.1, 2322, and
2315.267 According to these courts, in order to establish liability on the
part of a lessor who has passed on responsibility for the condition of
his property to his lessee under R.S. 9:3221, a plaintiff must establish
that (1) he sustained damages, (2) there was a defect in the property,
and (3) the lessor knew or should have known of the defect.268 This
divides the jurisprudence down artificial lines, creating two distinct
bodies of case law—one for tort cases involving waivers, another for
cases involving no waiver—where there should be only one.269
Moreover, courts spend time examining the scope of assumption
clauses to determine whether alleged defects fall within their purview,
even though ultimately the clause can have no effect on a tort claim.270
Not only is this a waste of judicial resources, it is misleading to the
public, who wrongly continue to regard assumption clauses as an
important contractual component for the management of tort
liability.271 Even when misunderstanding does not occur, this
266. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3221 (2013); see supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Jamison, 2006-0842 at p. 8; 955 So. 2d at 166; Smith, 2003-1412 at pp.
5-6; 886 So. 2d at 530.
268. Jamison, 2006-0842 at p. 8; 955 So. 2d at 166.
269. For example, when a waiver is in place, courts apply R.S. 9:3221 to hold that the
lessor is not under any duty to inspect. See, e.g., id.; 955 So. 2d at 165. The general analysis
of a lessor’s duty under articles 2322 and 2317.1 to inspect the leased premises for potential
defects is as yet undeveloped. The “waiver” jurisprudence could be helpful in ascertaining
what duty an owner who has not leased his property has to inspect, but because it is tied to
the statute rather than to the fact of the lease, it is divorced from the rest of the larger body of
law.
270. See, e.g., Cochran, 02-1272, 02-1273, 02-1274 at pp. 7-8; 845 So. 2d at 1132
(finding that trial court inappropriately applied R.S. 9:3221 because lessee did not assume
responsibility for condition of common areas); Jones, 00-1654 at p. 5; 782 So. 2d at 13-14
(analyzing clarity of waiver before turning to discussion of lessor’s negligence).
271. See 2 PETER S. TITLE, LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES, LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 18:26 (2012) (“Practice Tip: The lessor should be careful to include a
clause in the lease that shifts responsibility for injury to third parties to the lessee to the extent
provided by La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:3221.”). Indeed, following the 1996 tort reforms, the only
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jurisprudence is damaging to the clarity and integrity of the rationales
and policies underlying this area of the law.
4.

Episode 4: The Exception Swallows the New Rules

R.S. 9:3221’s final episode is perhaps the most unsettling,
because it relates less to judicial misapplication of the statute and more
to legislative oversight in the revision process. R.S. 9:3221 contained
the only legislative treatment of contractual waivers of the lessor’s
warranty against vice and defects until 2005, when a comprehensive
revision of the Civil Code’s title on Lease was undertaken.272 The
revision introduced new article 2699, which makes clear that the
lessor’s warranty against vices and defects may be waived, but places
important limitations on that waiver.273 The article provides in full:
The warranty provided in [articles 2696-2698] may be waived, but
only by clear and unambiguous language that is brought to the attention
of the lessee.
Nevertheless, a waiver of warranty is ineffective:
(1) To the extent it pertains to vices or defects of which the lessee
did not know and the lessor knew or should have known;
(2) To the extent it is contrary to the provisions of Article 2004; or
(3) In a residential or consumer lease, to the extent it purports to
waive the warranty for vices or defects that seriously affect
274
health or safety.

The specificity of the enumerated limitations in article 2699 would
seem to indicate that the legislature intended for the article to provide
the exclusive grounds for invalidation of a clause in the lease altering
the lessor’s obligations in warranty. However, the introduction of
article 2699 was not coupled with a repeal of R.S. 9:3221. To the
contrary, in the same legislation enacting new article 2699, the
legislature amended and reenacted R.S. 9:3221.275 The amended
version of the statute is nearly identical to its previous iteration, but
includes an introductory phrase that purports to address the statute’s
relationship to article 2699. The statute now reads:

continued effect of R.S. 9:3221 in the realm of tort is to prevent the lessor from waiving
liability for a lessee’s damages resulting from the lessor’s negligence, in direct contravention
of article 2004, which would allow such waivers in the absence of physical injury. See supra
notes 228-229 and accompanying text.
272. 2004 La. Acts 2556-57.
273. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699 (2005).
274. Id.
275. 2004 La. Acts 2614.
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Notwithstanding the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2699,
the owner of premises leased under a contract whereby the lessee
assumes responsibility for their condition is not liable for injury caused
by any defect therein to the lessee or anyone on the premises who
derives his right to be thereon from the lessee, unless the owner knew or
should have known of the defect or had received notice thereof and
276
failed to remedy it within a reasonable time.

The introductory language suggests that R.S. 9:3221 operates as an
exception to article 2699, though it remains unclear when precisely the
exception, as opposed to the rule, should apply. R.S. 9:3221 has
applied historically to all claims for damages relating to the
enforceability of a waiver of the lessor’s warranty against vices and
defects, regardless of whether those claims involved damages for
personal injury, loss of property, or other economic losses.277 Thus, it
would appear that R.S. 9:3221, not article 2699, applies to every claim
for damages resulting from breach of the lessor’s warranty. This
reading results in a marked restriction of the protective scope of article
2699—warranty waivers in leases of immovables would be practically
exempt from the limitations of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, this is the
prevailing view of the appellate courts278 and the leading practice
manual on Louisiana real estate.279
The redactors of the legislation enacting article 2699 and
amending R.S. 9:3221 apparently anticipated the conflict that would
arise from a plain reading of the legislation in pari materia and sought
to address the relationship between the two provisions in the official
comments to article 2699. To that end, comment (h) to article 2699
provides:
Civil Code Article 2699 (Rev. 2004) deals with the contractual
obligations between the parties rather than with the delictual or quasidelictual obligations that one party may incur vis a vis the other party,
or vis a vis third parties. Consequently, Civil Code Article 2699 (Rev.
2004) does not supersede the provisions of R.S. 9:3221 which provides
for delictual or quasi-delictual obligations incurred as a result of injury
occurring in the leased premises. Section 3 of this Act amends and
276. Id. (emphasis added).
277. See, e.g., Wells v. Norris, 46,458, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11); 71 So. 3d
1165, 1169; Stuckey v. Riverstone Residential SC, LP, 2008-1770, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir.
8/5/09); 21 So. 3d 970, 976; Greely v. OAG Props., LLC, 44,240, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/13/09); 12 So. 3d 490, 495.
278. Wells, 46,458 at pp. 6-7; 71 So. 3d at 1169; Stuckey, 2008-1770, at p. 10; 21 So.
3d at 976; Greely, 44,240 at pp. 9-10; 12 So. 3d at 495.
279. 2 TITLE, supra note 271, § 18.24 (“La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:3221 controls and
supersedes any contrary provision of Civil Code Article 2699.”).
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reenacts R.S. 9:3221 to provide that the amendment and reenactment of
280
Civil Code Article 2699 does not change the law of R.S. 9:3221.

Thus, according to comment (h), article 2699’s limitations apply only
to waivers of the lessor’s contractual obligations, while R.S. 9:3221
applies only to waivers of the lessor’s obligations in tort.
There are a number of obvious problems with this comment.
First is the question of whether it reflects an accurate statement of the
law. While it may be true that the statute, when originally enacted in
1932, was intended to govern delictual obligations only,281 it cannot be
said with confidence that the statute currently deals only with the
lessor’s responsibilities in tort. Such a statement would be contrary to
the jurisprudential history of R.S. 9:3221, throughout which the statute
has been applied to govern a lessor’s contractual obligations in
warranty.282 Moreover, if indeed R.S. 9:3221 applies to actions in tort
only, then it currently serves no practical purpose whatsoever other
than to prevent the lessor from waiving liability for a lessee’s damages
resulting from the lessor’s negligence, in direct contravention of article
2004, which would allow such waivers in the absence of physical
injury. As discussed above, since 1996, a landlord’s delictual
responsibility for defective premises is assessed according to a
negligence standard.283 Thus, there is no longer any need for special
legislation that reduces the standard of liability to negligence when
certain preconditions are met. So far, the comment has worked to lead
courts entirely astray. Attempting to find some purpose for this statute
in “tort,” numerous courts have now concluded (quite wrongly) that a
case involving personal injuries, even when predicated on article 2696,
is necessarily an action in tort.284
Comment (h) states that that the amendment and reenactment of
Civil Code article 2699 “does not change the law of R.S. 9:3221.”285
Indeed, the amendment and reenactment of R.S. 9:3221 with an
introductory clause instructing that the provision applies “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of . . . Article 2699” leads to the conclusion

280. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699 cmt. (h) (2013).
281. See supra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 187-220 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 253-255 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Wells v. Norris, 46,458 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11); 71 So. 3d 1165;
Stuckey v. Riverstone Residential SC, LP, 2008-1770 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/5/09); 21 So. 3d 970;
Greely v. OAG Props., LLC, 44,240 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/13/09); 12 So. 3d 490. This
conclusion is only implicit in the reasoning of these cases.
285. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699 cmt. (h).
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that the statute and its interpreting jurisprudence remain in place.286
The result is therefore that code and statute must be interpreted as
occupying the same territory, with the consequence that the statute
dominates over the Civil Code. This is no less than disastrous, because
the drafting of article 2699 involved a careful balancing of the rights of
lessor and lessee, and that work now has been undermined by the
persistence of the statute and its jurisprudential gloss.287 The
protections of article 2699, and the extent to which they are
undermined, are explored below.
a.

Requirements for Formation

Article 2699 sets forth explicit formal requirements for a waiver
of the lessor’s warranty. The article provides that the warranty may be
waived “only by clear and unambiguous language that is brought to the
attention of the lessee.”288 This limitation seeks to make the lessee
aware that the lease dramatically alters his legal rights regarding the
condition of the premises leased. Its effect is to require that the waiver
be not only clear and unambiguous, but also explained to the lessee.289
The case law interpreting R.S. 9:3221 has developed a different
set of requirements for the formation of a valid assumption clause.
While it is imperative that the contract clearly and unambiguously
waive the lessee’s right to recovery, it is not necessary that the
assumption clause be brought to the attention of the lessee or
explained to him.290 The foundational case in this line of jurisprudence
is Ford v. Bienvenu, a case predating the amendments to article 2699
and involving a condominium tenant who sued his landlord for loss of
property resulting from a fire.291 When the landlord defended on the
ground that the lease contained a valid waiver of the warranty against
vices and defects, the plaintiff insisted that “although warranties and
obligations imposed under the Civil Code may sometimes be waived,
the waiver of warranties is only valid if they are clear and
unambiguous and brought to the attention of the lessee.”292 The court
dismissed this assertion, stating that the plaintiff’s argument was
286. 2004 La. Acts 2614.
287. See Palmer, supra note 188, at 34 (calling for making the lessor’s obligation to
guarantee the safety of the premises imperative (i.e., nonwaivable)).
288. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699.
289. See LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 123, § 3.1.2.
290. See Ford v. Bienvenu, 2000-2376, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/29/01); 804 So. 2d
64, 69-70.
291. Id.
292. Id. at p. 7; 804 So. 2d at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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improperly based on the law governing waivers of a seller’s
warranties.293 According to the court, although article 2548, which
pertains to waivers of the seller’s warranty against redhibitory defects,
requires waivers to be clear and unambiguous and brought to the
attention of the buyer, “[t]here is no similar provision contained in the
codal articles relating to ‘lease.’”294
The comments to article 2699 state that the amended article seeks
to bring the law of lease into line with the law of sale.295 Thus, it seems
clear that the new legislation is designed to overrule Ford and its
progeny. However, since the 2005 revision, Louisiana courts have
continued to hold that waivers of the lessor’s warranty against vices
and defects need not be brought to the attention of the lessee despite
the clear requirements of article 2699—a result that is devastating to
the policies behind the article.296 The reasoning behind this conclusion
rests precariously on the new introductory language to revised R.S.
9:3221. As articulated recently by the Louisiana Court of Appeal for
the First Circuit:
La. R.S. 9:3221 operates as an express statutory exception to La. C.C.
art. 2699 where the lessee assumes responsibility for the condition of
leased premises. Where the language of a provision transferring
delictual liability under La. R.S. 9:3221 is clear and unambiguous, the
law does not require that the provision be brought to the lessee’s
attention or explained to him. Thus, La. C.C. art. 2699’s requirement
that a waiver of the lessor’s warranty against vices or defects be brought
to the attention of the lessee does not apply to a provision transferring
297
responsibility for purposes of La. R.S. 9:3221.

293. Id. (“[Defendants] argue that those cases are distinguishable because they involve
the sale or lease of movables. We agree. . . . La. C.C. art. 2548 provides that the parties to a
sale may agree to an exclusion or limitation of the warranty against redhibitory defects, and
the terms of such exclusion or limitation ‘must be clear and unambiguous and must be
brought to the attention of the buyer.’”).
294. Id.
295. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699 cmt. (c) (2013). The comments go on to state that
the mandate that warranty waivers must be “clear and unambiguous” and “brought to the
attention of the lessee” is derived from Louisiana jurisprudence involving waivers of the
lessor’s warranty against vices and defects. It is notable, however, that these jurisprudential
sources are cases that involved leases of movable, rather than immovable, things. See id.
(citing Andrus v. Cajun Insulation Co., 524 So. 2d 1239, 1245-46 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1988)
(King, J., concurring)).
296. See, e.g., Wells v. Norris, 46,458, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11); 71 So. 3d 1165,
1169; Stuckey v. Riverstone Residential SC, LP, 2008-1770, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/5/09); 21
So. 3d 970, 976; Greely v. OAG Props., LLC, 44,240, p. 8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/13/09); 12 So.
3d 490, 494.
297. Stuckey, 2008-1770 at p. 10; 21 So. 3d at 976 (citations omitted).
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Strikingly, all of the cases reaching this result involved residential
tenants—those most in need of explanations of the contracts that they
sign. Article 2699’s mandate that a waiver be not only clearly drafted
but also specifically pointed out to the lessee is a progressive, policybased requirement that seeks to ensure that waivers result from actual
bargaining.298 By requiring the lessor to point out the exculpatory
provision and explain it to the lessee, the law protects the lessee from
unfair surprise. This protection is especially important in residential
leases, which are often adhesive. And yet, this protection has now
been denied repeatedly to its intended recipients.
b.

The Effect of the Parties’ Knowledge

Article 2699(1) provides that a waiver of warranty is ineffective if
it “pertains to vices or defects of which the lessee did not know and the
lessor knew or should have known.”299 This provision is designed to
prohibit the lessor from unfairly inducing the lessee’s acquiescence in
the waiver. Waiver is only disallowed under this provision if the lessee
is unaware of the defect; if the lessee does know of a defect’s existence,
then he may effectively waive the warranty with respect to that item.300
Even if the lessee is unaware of the defect, the waiver is invalid only if
the lessor knew or should have known of its presence. Where the
lessor had actual knowledge of the defect’s existence and concealed it
from the lessee to induce a waiver, it may be argued that the lessor
committed fraud.301 Article 2699(1) goes further than existing law,
however, by making a waiver ineffective when the lessee merely ought
to have known about the defect.302
Significantly, article 2699(1)’s limitations relate to the parties’
knowledge at the time the waiver is executed. The same provision
298. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699 cmt. (c).
299. Id. art. 2699(1). The comments explain:
A waiver is ineffective if: (a) the lessee did not know of the vice or defect; and
(b) the lessor either knew or should have known of it. Conversely, a waiver is
effective: (a) if, regardless of the lessor’s knowledge, the lessee knew of the vice or
defect; or (b) if, regardless of the lessee’s knowledge, the lessor did not know nor
should he have known of the vice or defect.
Id. art. 2699 cmt. (e).
300. See LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 123, § 3.1.2.
301. See id.; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1953-1954. Additionally, an argument exists
that such a waiver would be unenforceable simply on the basis of the lessor’s bad faith. See
Andrus v. Cajun Insulation Co., 524 So. 2d 1239, 1243 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1988) (citing
PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNÈS, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL, LES CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX
§ 647 (Cujas ed. 1986)).
302. See LEVASSEUR & GRUNING, supra note 123, § 3.1.2.
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does not lead to the invalidation of a waiver if the lessor learns or
should learn of the defect after the execution of the lease. This is
suggested, though rather opaquely, by article 2699(2), which states that
waivers are also invalid to the extent they are “contrary to the
provisions of Article 2004.”303 While article 2004 prohibits any clause
that shields an obligor from his own intentional or gross fault, the
article clearly permits parties to a contract to agree that an obligor will
not be liable for his own negligence.304 Thus, reading articles 2004 and
2699 in pari materia, it becomes clear that a lessor does not lose the
protection of an otherwise valid waiver of the warranty against vices
and defects merely because he subsequently learns of a defect in the
leased premises and fails to remedy it.
As discussed above, the law of warranty waivers up until the
2005 revision had always been a poor fit with the public policy norms
inherent in article 2004.305 By permitting waivers not colored by the
bad faith of the lessor, article 2699 endeavors to bring the law
governing warranty waivers into line with more modern
pronouncements of the permissible with respect to exculpatory
clauses. And yet, R.S. 9:3221, which invalidates a waiver of warranty
when the lessor fails to repair a known defect, not only remains in
force but operates as an exception to the new Civil Code provision.
Thus, in leases of premises only, warranty waivers apply only to
defects of which the lessor could not have been aware.
From the tenant’s point of view, this result is hardly detrimental.
However, the dominance of R.S. 9:3221 over general principles of law
has distressing effects for landlords. Even after contractually shifting
responsibility for the condition of the premises to the tenant, the
landlord is not relieved of his burden. The mere notification of a
defect by a tenant suddenly subjects the landlord to practical necessity,
if not the obligation, to make necessary repairs.306 This state of affairs
303. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699(2).
304. See supra notes 221-224 and accompanying text.
305. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
306. As discussed supra note 209, the Louisiana Supreme Court has drawn a technical
distinction under R.S. 9:3221 between the responsibility to make repairs and the
responsibility for damages resulting from injuries caused by defects in the premises. For
example, in Hebert v. Neyrey, a case involving a lease stating that the lessee assumed
responsibility for the condition of the premises but also providing that the lessor would make
necessary repairs caused by fire or other casualty and not caused by the lessee’s fault, the
lessor was held responsible for the repair of pipes damaged by freezing weather. 445 So. 2d
1165, 1168 n.3 (La. 1984). However, as a practical matter, because R.S. 9:3221 imposes
liability for damages on landlords who fail to make repairs in a timely manner, the statute acts
to shift responsibility for taking steps to make repairs to the landlord once he is notified of the
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is especially irrational in the context of commercial leasing, where
sophisticated parties take the costs of repairs and defects and resulting
damages into consideration when negotiating rent and procuring
insurance.
c.

Actual and Threatened Physical Harm

Article 2699’s reference to article 2004 does more than speak to
the effect of the lessor’s knowledge. It also makes clear that a waiver
of the warranty against vices and defects can never shield the lessor
from liability for personal injuries. At first blush, this provision
appears to be designed to close the door on the debate surrounding
whether article 2004 applies to a lessee’s claim for personal injuries.307
Indeed, the explicit reference to article 2004 leads inexorably to this
conclusion. Article 2004’s placement in the title on Conventional
Obligations implies that it applies by default to all contracts, including
leases, unless a contrary and more specific rule states otherwise.308 No
explicit reference to article 2004 is necessary, unless the redactors
sought to emphasize its application.
However, because the
introductory phrase of R.S. 9:3221 states that the statute applies
“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article 2699,” a court could
decide to ignore the public policy limitations of article 2004 in leases
of premises.309 Indeed, this interpretation is encouraged by the leading
practice manual on real estate.310
Moreover, article 2699(3) extends protection beyond that
required in article 2004 when it states that in a residential or consumer
lease a warranty waiver is invalid “to the extent it purports to waive the
warranty for vices or defects that seriously affect health or safety.”311
The comments explain that this limitation, while not reflected in the
Louisiana jurisprudence, was added to bring Louisiana law into closer

defect, lest he subject himself to potential liability for damages resulting from his failure to
do so. Ostensibly, in such a case the landlord could seek compensation from the tenant for
the cost of the repairs that were made. Even then, the statute shifts to the landlord the burden
of outlaying expenses in the first place and seeking recompense from a tenant who may
refuse or be unable to pay.
307. See supra notes 225-246 and accompanying text.
308. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699 (“In all matters not provided for in this Title,
the contract of lease is governed by the rules of the Titles of ‘Obligations in General’ and
‘Conventional Obligations or Contracts’.”).
309. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3221 (2013).
310. 2 TITLE, supra note 271, § 18:26 (“As amended in 2004, La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 9:3221 clearly supersedes Civil Code Article 2004.”).
311. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699(3).
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alignment with the law of other states.312 In most American
jurisdictions, waiver of the common law warranty of habitability is
prohibited in residential and consumer leases.313 Although article 2699
does not completely prohibit waivers of the lessor’s warranty, it adopts
a “middle position” of prohibiting waivers that would insulate the
lessor from liability resulting from a defect that would pose a serious
threat to the health or safety of the lessee.314
R.S. 9:3221 contains no language limiting the enforceability of
waivers when a tenant’s health or safety is at risk. Instead, by its plain
terms the statute sanctions waivers resulting from defects of all types,
regardless of the potential harm to the lessee or third parties, as long as
the lessor was not negligent in failing to repair a known defect.
Interpreting the statute as an exception to article 2699 thus has the
effect of nullifying the carefully considered limitations on contractual
freedom contained within the Code.315
V.

CONCLUSION

Numerous conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing
discussion of R.S. 9:3221 and its relationship with the Civil Code.
First, it is apparent that the current state of the law governing
contractual waivers of the lessor’s responsibility for defective premises
is untenable. Although clauses purporting to shift responsibility from
the lessor to the lessee are included in both residential and commercial
leases as a matter of course,316 their enforceability is highly
questionable. It is unknown whether these clauses, as a prerequisite to
312. Id. art. 2699 cmt. (g).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., Wells v. Norris, 46,458 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11); 71 So. 3d 1165
(holding that waiver shielded landlord from liability for personal injuries resulting from fire
caused by defective fuse box); Stuckey v. Riverstone Residential SC, LP, 2008-1770 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 8/5/09); 21 So. 3d 970 (upholding waiver of warranty with respect to toxigenic
mold); Greely v. OAG Props., LLC, 44,240 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/13/09); 12 So. 3d 490 (finding
waiver precluded personal injury claim); see also Biggs v. Cancienne, 2012-0187 (La. App. 1
Cir. 9/21/12); 111 So. 3d 6 (reversing summary judgment on question of whether defendantlessor lacked a “reasonable time” to make repairs to property and was therefore relieved of
liability for tenant’s injuries under RS 9:3221). But see Stone v. Pelican Pointe-NE Ltd.
P’ship, 2012-0091 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/12); 2012 WL 4354745 (denying application for
supervisory writs and reversal of trial court’s finding on motion for summary judgment that
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2696 through 2699 and article 2004 governed lessee’s personal
injury claim, not RS 9:3221).
316. See 2 TITLE, supra note 271, § 18:116 (form for assumption of liability clause);
id. § 18:117 (form for assumption of responsibility for repairs, vices, and defects in
residential lease); id. § 18:119 (form for assumption of responsibility for defects in
commercial lease).
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their enforceability, must be specifically brought to the attention of the
lessee at the time of the formation of the lease or whether their mere
inclusion in a signed standard form contract is sufficient.317 It is
uncertain whether the parties to a lease may agree that the lessor will
bear no responsibility for defects in the premises as long as he remains
in good faith, or whether a lessor retains the responsibility to timely
repair defects that become known even after the lessee has agreed to
accept responsibility for maintenance.318 It is unclear whether a waiver,
if otherwise enforceable, will shield a lessor from liability for his
tenant’s personal injuries or from other damage caused by a defect that
poses a serious risk to the tenant’s health and safety.319 One cannot
predict with confidence whether a waiver’s enforceability will vary if
the lessee seeks damages versus other forms of relief, or if the action is
based in tort or contract.320 In fact, there is little about the legal regime
governing waivers of the lessor’s warranty that is clear other than the
fact that this narrow area of the law is highly unsettled.
The predictability and certainty of lessor liability are essential to
ensure a functioning rental market in this state. Louisiana property
owners are potentially exposed to tremendous liability for latent
defects, and fear of high damage awards may drive up the price of
space and liability insurance, or dissuade the risk averse from entering
the market at all. At the same time, important public policy concerns
militate against the absolute enforceability of exculpatory clauses,
particularly in residential leases, even if the end result is a marginal
inflation of the cost of leased property. Moreover, litigation involving
the lessor’s obligation to maintain property free of vices and defects is
plentiful.321 Because of the clear need to balance the concerns of
lessors and lessees, one would expect the rules governing lessor
liability to be clearly and thoughtfully articulated, leaving little to no
question regarding whether and to what extent that liability can be
contractually altered by the parties to a lease. Why, then, is this not the
case?

317. See supra Part IV.C.4(a).
318. See supra Part IV.C.4(b).
319. See supra Part IV.C.4(c).
320. See supra Part IV.C.3-.4.
321. In the last decade, over fifty such cases were litigated at the appellate level. This
figure does not include cases that were tried but not appealed, or those that settled out of
court. The total number of actionable claims is therefore likely much higher. In any event,
the number of reported decisions dealing with lessor liability serves as one indication of its
social significance.
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The answer to this question is not a simple one. The problem is
not necessarily one of legislative inaction. The Civil Code has long
contained provisions that delineate the standards by which parties can
contractually alter obligations implied by law.322 But those articles and
the principles contained within them have been forced to compete with
legislation existing outside of the framework of the Code—a special
interest statute enacted over eighty years ago to solve a problem that
today no longer exists. For decades, R.S. 9:3221 has been interpreted
broadly and dynamically, contrary to established principles of
interpretation applicable to statutory law, and as a result has been
allowed to directly contradict Civil Code directives governing the
power of lessor and lessee to allocate between themselves
responsibility for leased premises. Even worse, the full reach of the
statute has been misunderstood repeatedly by the redactors of the
rolling revision, resulting in a jumbled body of law that is today nearly
impossible to apply sensibly.
The best course of action to rectify the confusion wrought
by the interaction between R.S. 9:3221 and the Civil Code is the
complete repeal of the statutory provision. In its absence,
Louisiana Civil Code article 2699 would properly govern the
enforceability and effects of warranty waivers executed between
lessors and lessees. Thus, the Code would require that waivers be
drawn in clear and unambiguous language and brought to the
attention of the lessee.323 The Code would preclude waivers of
defects of which the lessor knew or should have known, and of
which the lessee was unaware, at the time of the lease, but would
not prevent the parties from waiving liability for defects of which
the parties later became aware.324 Finally, the Code would prevent
the enforceability of a waiver to insulate lessors from liability for
personal injuries or, in the case of residential or consumer leases,
defects posing a threat to health or safety.325 Significantly,
although repeal of the statute would work to significantly improve
the law governing a lessor’s contractual responsibility to his tenant,
it would present little substantive change in the law of torts, where
a lessor’s responsibility is today predicated solely on his

322. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 7 & cmt. (c) (2013); id. art. 2004 (2012); LA.
CIV. CODE arts. 11, 1764 (1870).
323. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2699 (2013).
324. Id. art. 2699(1)-(2).
325. Id. art. 2699(2)-(3).
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negligence, even in cases involving attempted waivers.326 And yet,
repeal of the statute would bring clarity to this area of the law as
well, by removing the source of courts’ confusion regarding the
effect of waivers on tort claims.
Without the statute’s repeal, courts are hindered in their
power to bring sense to law governing warranty waivers. Courts
could theoretically rectify the conflict between Code and statute by
applying R.S. 9:3221 only to a lessor’s tort responsibilities
according to its original purpose and the direction of comment (h)
to article 2699. This approach admits a number of weaknesses,
however. Tassin and its progeny—a line of cases that now
amounts to jurisprudence constante—must be abruptly renounced.
Furthermore, although courts are free to find that laws have been
impliedly repealed in appropriate cases,327 courts may be reluctant
to find the statute repealed by implication, particularly in light of
the fact that it was reenacted in 2005. To restrict R.S. 9:3221 to
tort claims between lessors and third parties would be to read the
statute into obsolescence; as discussed above, the statute no longer
has any practical effect when applied to tort claims of that type.328
The enactment, interpretation, application, and revision of R.S.
9:3221 reveal just one example of the methodological difficulties
posed by statutory law in Louisiana. As the Civil Code Ancillaries
continue to be used as a “dumping place” for special interest
legislation,329 and as the rolling revision continues to undertake
repeated and piecemeal reform of isolated areas of private law, conflict
between Code and statute is bound to occur, likely with increasing
frequency. The interaction between R.S. 9:3221 and the Civil Code
may be anomalous, but it should not be mistaken for an isolated
occurrence. Rather, there are a great many lessons to be learned from
this cautionary tale about the drafting and interpretation of statutory
law, its placement within the hierarchy of the sources of law in this
state, the proper placement within code and statute of legislative rules
and standards, and the attention that must be given to statutory law
throughout the revision process. This Article has sought to elicit those

326. See infra notes 252-255 and accompanying text. Of course, repeal of R.S. 9:3221
would have the beneficial effect of aligning the parties’ ability to waive the lessor’s
negligence with the rules set forth in article 2004.
327. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 8.
328. See infra notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
329. Yiannopoulos, supra note 61, at 837.
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lessons from this story and, in so doing, begin a productive dialogue
regarding the proper role of statutory law in modern-day Louisiana.

